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1 Introduction
Models are the central instruments of modern day science. They are used in a mul-
titude of diﬀerent scientific contexts to predict and explain phenomena, to explore
the consequences of various theoretical assumptions, and provide advice in political
decision making. A wide variety of diﬀerent kinds of things are used as models,
ranging from material objects—such as the scale model of an aircraft and model
organisms used in laboratory—to abstract mathematical models specified by sys-
tems of diﬀerential equations, and computer simulations that have recently become
popular in the social sciences.
Theoretical modelling is a particularly useful strategy in contexts where the at-
tempt is to understand or predict complex phenomena that are diﬃcult to examine
in an experimental setting (Mäki 2005, 304). This situation is ubiquitous in the
social sciences, where the phenomena studied are inextricably complex processes
such as business cycles, the emergence of social order, or the eﬀects of policy inter-
ventions on people’s behaviour. Theoretical models, on the other hand, are typically
simple, highly abstract, and idealized systems that scientists can study instead of
the complex reality, to impose artificial order onto an otherwise confusing mess of in-
teracting factors, thus gaining a theoretical handle on the target under investigation
(Weisberg 2007; Godfrey-Smith 2006).1
Philosophy of modelling is a sub-branch of philosophy of science, which exami-
nes foundational issues having to do with the nature and uses of models in science.
Among the central issues which have traditionally preoccupied philosophers of mo-
delling is the question concerning the relationship between models and the world:
how should we conceive of the relationship between the abstract theoretical con-
structs of science on the one hand, and complex empirical phenomena on the other?
This thesis starts with what has unquestionably become the most prominent
answer to this question—namely that the function of models is to represent, or
1Thus understood, theoretical models are abstract and simplified systems not based on data
about any particular empirical facts, but rather provide abstract schemes of causal mechanism
purportedly underlying a class of phenomena (Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014, see esp. 25-29). In
this thesis, I will use the term model to refer to theoretical models in this sense. For discussion
concerning the notion of a theoretical model, see Achinstein (1965) and Giere (1999, Sect. 8).
1
stand for, parts of the world, and that the best way to understand the model-
world relationship is to analyse it in representational terms. Rising to popularity
towards the end of the 20th century, the representational view has become the
mainstream account of models. In addition to providing an analysis of the relation
between models and the world, this conception also has become to be relied on in
the analysis of a number of distinct problems in philosophy of modelling, spanning
from ontological questions about the nature of model systems to epistemological
problems concerning the way in which modelling can ground scientific knowledge
claims. Thus, our philosophical understanding of modelling has become dependent
on the view that models are first and foremost representations.
The representational conception, however, is subject to what is commonly refer-
red to as the problem of representation (Callender and Cohen 2006, 68-70; Knuuttila
2005, 43-44; Frigg and Hartmann 2012, Section 1.1). The problem is that, as R. I.
G. Hughes (1997, 325) put it, ’the concept of representation is as slippery as that
of a model.’ In short, unless we are able to specify what we mean by the claim that
models represent the world, representation is not likely to be a very helpful concept
in analysing the model-world relations, let alone other issues of modelling. Alas,
as of today, philosophers have been unable to reach agreement about how model
representation should be understood.
Deflationism about representation, is a meta-theoretical approach towards theo-
rising about representation which is motivated by a suspicion that the persistence
of the problem of representation in the context of modelling might not be a matter
of coincidence. Perhaps the reason why all attempts at solving the problem have
been inconclusive is that there is something wrong with how the problem has been
conceived of. Building on this sceptical ground, deflationism sets oﬀ to consider the
possibility that analyses of representation are bound to fail because, in fact, the
concept of representation is unanalysable, and consequently, the problem of repre-
sentation is a pseudo-problem. Thus, the aim of deflationism about representation
is to dissolve, rather than solve, the problem of representation.
The subject of this thesis concerns the uses to which a deflationary theory of
representation could be put in philosophy of modelling, and the reasons for which
we might favour a deflationist approach instead of its alternative, substantivism about
representation. The upshot of the deflationary ’analysis’ of representation is often
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understood to be that there is no underlying nature to representation which philosop-
hical theorising could uncover. One might suppose that, as a consequence, theorising
about representation in philosophy of modelling should be put to an end. Nonet-
heless, philosophers associated with deflationism keep putting forward accounts of
representation which they argue help us understand important aspects of modelling
(e.g. Suárez 2015; van Fraassen 2008; Giere 2004). What kind of understanding can
we attain with a deflationary analysis of representation? Furthermore, what does it
mean to study modelling as representation from a deflationist perspective? These
are the questions that this thesis will address.
Perhaps the most ardent defender of deflationism—and critic of substantivism
about representation—has been Mauricio Súarez (1999; 2003; 2004; 2006; 2010;
2015). Suárez has argued that diﬀerent substantive accounts fail as general theo-
ries of representation because representation is a concept which does not lend itself
to an analytic treatment (Suárez 2003; 2010). Basing on these criticisms, Suárez has
over the years developed his own inferential conception of representation, which is
put forward as a deflationary account designed to avoid the shortcomings of subs-
tantivism (Suárez 2004; Suárez and Solé 2006; Suárez 2015). My treatment below
will draw on, and at points criticise, Suárez’s deflationism.
At this point it has probably become clear that a discussion of deflationism about
representation, at least one basing on Suárezian notions, will at same time have to
be a discussion of substantivism. Thus, to examine the import and uses of defla-
tionism, my strategy here will be to compare Suárez’s account with a noteworthy
substantivist alternative. The substantivist theory I have chosen as a point of com-
parison is the weighted feature matching account recently put forward by Michel
Weisberg (2013; 2012). This theory is an ambitious attempt to formulate a gene-
ral account of the model-world relationship, which moreover aims to solve episte-
mological problems pertaining to modelling. Suárez (2015, 37) himself argues that
Weisberg is one of the main contemporary advocates of substantivism. Thus, weigh-
ted feature matching is well suited for our purposes. How do the deflationism of
the inferential conception and the substantivism of Weisberg’s account shed light
on problems concerning modelling? My aim is to compare these two accounts qua
deflationary and substantivist theories, to find out what the import of the diﬀerent
meta-theoretical approaches might be.
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To do so, I will naturally have to investigate the issue of how deflationism and
substantivism diﬀer. In addition, discussing the above questions presupposes some
understanding of the problems involved in modelling, as well as of the role given to
the concept of representation in addressing them. Therefore this thesis consists of
three chapters which introduce these prerequisite ideas, followed by three chapters
which discuss the two theories of representation and their relative merits.
In Chapter 2, I will introduce the historical background to the debates concer-
ning representation in philosophy of modelling. The developments presented there
will serve to pinpoint the motivations underlying, first, the adoption of the represen-
tational conception of models, and second, the deflationary rejection of substantivist
accounts of representation.
Chapter 3 presents a popular view which understands theoretical models as sys-
tems of surrogative reasoning (Swoyer 1991)—that is, systems examined in order to
draw inferences regarding some target distinct from them. I will also introduce three
examples of modelling from the social sciences which will be useful for illustrative
purposes in the later discussion. Finally, I will discuss the diﬀerent problems that
have often been argued to be the concern of theories of representation.
After having acquainted ourselves with the background concerning modelling and
representation, in Chapter 4 we will turn to examining deflationism and substanti-
vism. I will argue that Suárez contrasts his deflationism with a naïve dyadic form of
substantivism which most philosophers today would reject. I will then propose an
amended form of substantivism and discuss the diﬀerent ways in which deflationism
could be contrasted with this formulation. Basing on the discussion, I distinguish
five forms of deflationism about representation, which all reject diﬀerent parts of
substantivism.
Chapter 5 then applies these formulations to the inferential conception of repre-
sentation and weighted feature matching. The aim of this chapter is to show that
these two accounts can indeed be understood according to deflationism and subs-
tantivism, respectively. If I succeed in doing so, the two accounts can be compared
in order to examine how they both fare in dealing with the problems of representa-
tion discussed earlier in Chapter 3. I undertake this discussion in Chapter 6, where I
moreover try to articulate ways in which deflationary representation could be useful
for understanding modelling.
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In Chapter 7, I take up the question of the import of deflationary theories of
representation in philosophy of modelling. I will compare Suárezian deflationism
with the substantivist approach as well as with another deflationary approach accor-
ding to which scientific representation can be reduced to stipulation (e.g. Callender
and Cohen 2006). Basing on this comparison, I propose that theories of represen-
tation formulated according to Suárez’s deflationism can be viewed as providing
conceptualisations of the norms that govern the practice of scientific model buil-
ding. Thus understood, the framework given by deflationism is more informative
about representation than the stipulationist picture, but places fewer restrictions on
the definition of representation than the substantivist alternatives.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with some general remarks concerning the possibi-
lities for the development of Suárezian deflationism about representation.
2 Structural representation and the motivation for
deflationism
The point of this chapter is to present the historical background underpinning the
debates about modelling and representation, as well as deflationism and substanti-
vism about representation. Representation became a central concept in philosophy
of modelling as a part of a new view of scientific theories which emerged in the la-
te decades of the 20th century. This view, nowadays known as the semantic view
of theories, gave centre stage to the notion of a model in its analysis of theories,
and the notion of representation was adopted in order to provide an account of the
relationship between models and the world (Knuuttila 2005, 12-13).
This historical trajectory is relevant for the topic of deflationism and substanti-
vism about representation because the contemporary theories of representation are
often based on an explicit rejection or development, respectively, of the accounts of
representation associated with the semantic view. Criticism of the theories of repre-
sentation associated with the semantic view can thus be seen as the motivating force
behind deflationism about representation. On the other hand, adopting a deflatio-
nary approach to theorizing about scientific representation has been argued to leave
us in a situation where representation no longer provides an analysis of the model-
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world relationship (Knuuttila 2010, 340; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, 3827). Let
us next examine these developments in greater detail.
2.1 The semantic view: models as non-linguistic structures
The interest of philosophers of science in scientific models arose in the 1950’s. It was
motivated by the need to understand issues having to do with theory construction,
theory change, and scientific discovery (Bailer-Jones 1999, 24-31). The philosop-
hical climate of the early 20th century was dominated by logical empiricist views
on science, which held that the proper target of analysis in philosophy of science
was theory rather than models. Models were thought of as carrying at most aest-
hetic, didactic, or heuristic value, and their epistemic contributions to science were
regarded as subservient to abstract theories. (Bailer-Jones 1999, 25-26.)
The emergence of an approach to scientific theories which made the notion of
a model central in its analysis changed the situation. Proponents of this approach,
nowadays often called the ’semantic view of theories’ (e.g. Winther 2016), held that
scientific theories should be analysed as collections or families of models, unders-
tood as sets of non-linguistic objects and relations between them—that is, as non-
linguistic structures (e.g. Suppes 1960; Suppe 1977; van Fraassen 1980; Giere 1988).
The view of theories as collections of structures diverged from the earlier view
associated with the logical empiricist doctrine. According to this doctrine, theo-
ries should be analysed as sets of statements, accompanied by designated rules of
interpretation that connect them to empirical observations. The theoretical state-
ments were to be analysed as devoid of content by formalizing them with the help
of a suitable logical language, such as first-order predicate logic (Feigl 1970, 4-6;
Suppes 1967, 56-57). Thus, logical empiricists believed that they could grasp the
structure of scientific theories solely by analysing the syntactic properties of the sta-
tements constituting them—hence the label ’syntactic view’ often attached to this
understanding of scientific theories.
The central problem facing the syntactic approach to theory structure is the
decision of which logical language should be chosen as the tool of analysis (Winther
2016, Section 1.1). The semantic view sought to avoid this problem by changing
the focus of analysis from the linguistic structure of theoretical statements to the
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mathematical structures that are the models of the theories.2 If theories are viewed
as collections of non-linguistic objects or structures, the problem of language choice
need not arise. Rather, analysis of the structure of theories can proceed by describing
the collection of models that make up the theory, as well as their relations to each
other and the world. In the words of van Fraassen,
The syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body of theorems, stated in one par-
ticular language chosen for the expression of that theory. This should be contrasted with
the alternative of presenting a theory in the first instance by identifying a class of structures
as its models. In this second, semantic, approach the language used to express the theory
is neither basic nor unique; the same class of structures could well be described in radically
diﬀerent ways, each with its own limitations. The models occupy centre stage. (van Fraassen
1980, 44.)
Although the semantic view brought models to the fore in its analysis of theories,
the analysis given is still a formal one, making use of the set-theoretical notion of
model. According to this notion, a model of a theory is an ordered tuple of objects
and relations between them—that is, a structure—such that taken together they
satisfy or make true the statements of the theory (Suppes 1960, 289-291). The objects
and relations constituting models are defined in a purely extensional fashion, and
may thus be taken to refer to any kind of things and connections between them
(Frigg 2006, 51-52). For instance, in classical particle mechanics the objects may be
interpreted as particles and the relations as their relative positions (Suppes 1960,
291). To take another example, in an agent-based simulation model of residential
segregation (e.g. Schelling 1971), the objects may be virtual actors in a computer
simulation and the relations their neighbourhood networks. The point with this
meta-mathematical notion of a model is that the specific content to which it is
applied is not important—all that is required for a model to satisfy the statements
of a theory is that it instantiates the right structural properties.
Suppes (1960) famously held that, in addition to its usefulness in the study of
mathematics, the set-theoretical notion of model could also be used to make sen-
2There were further problems associated with the syntactic approach that propelled the rise of
the semantic view. For a list and discussion, see Winther (2016, Section 3). See also Suppe (1989,
Ch. 2) for an account detailing the origins and development of the semantic view. Lutz (2014) is an
attempt to formulate a version of the syntactic view which avoids some of the problems associated
with the logical empiricist version.
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se of the role that models play in the empirical sciences. The idea here is that the
function served by models is to provide an interpretation for the content-free formal
statements of abstract theories. Models thus provide the semantics for formal theo-
ries which, pace the logical empiricist view, do not incorporate statements that are
directly about empirical observations. The statements of a theory, on the semantic
view, are about classes of theoretical structures which satisfy those statements and
moreover make them true (Hughes 1997, 325).3 To identify the content of an ab-
stract theory, on the semantic view, we should focus on analysing the properties of
these structures, rather than the syntactic structure of theoretical statements under
a particular linguistic formulation.
Diﬀerent proponents of the semantic view held somewhat diﬀerent versions of
the above described conception of models, but most of them take models to be
non-linguistic structures (see Suárez 1999, 75-76; Frigg 2006, 52 ft. 9; Frigg and
Hartmann 2012, section 2.3).4 Now, what is important about the semantic view
in its use of models in the analysis of theories is that questions concerning the
relationship between theories and the world also came to involve relations obtaining
between two kinds of non-linguistic entities: model structures and the world. As a
result, the concept of truth became inapplicable to the analysis of the theory-world
relation (Giere 1988, 79). If theories are non-linguistic entities, and if truth is a
property of language, then the relationship between theory and the world cannot be
conceived of in terms of truth and falsehood (Knuuttila 2005, 12-13).5
3Martin Thomson-Jones (2006) has argued that the semantic view should not be understood
to take models to be truth-making structures, but as mathematical structures used to represent
systems distinct from them.
4For instance, while Suppes (1960) emphasizes that models are extensional set-theoretic struc-
tures, van Fraassen (1980, 67) instead opts for the view that models are trajectories of states in a
mathematical space. Giere (1988) has been interpreted as an advocate of this latter approach, or
as holding a somewhat diﬀerent account (Winther 2016, Section 3.1.1). See Suppe (1989, Ch. 1)
for a discussion of the diﬀerences between the various notions of model involved with the semantic
view.
The semantic view has later been criticized for placing too much emphasis on abstract mathe-
matical models in its analysis of various scientific disciplines (Downes 1992; Godfrey-Smith 2006;
Thomson-Jones 2012). As a result, many contemporary accounts of modelling endeavour to accom-
modate the diversity of kinds of models used by scientists.
5Not everyone thinks that truth is out of the question in discussions about models as representa-
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Herein lies the motivation for theorizing about representation in the context of
scientific modelling. To secure a connection between non-linguistic model structures
and the empirical reality, the semantic theorists turned away from linguistic refe-
rence and truth, and began to put forward analyses of how models can function
as representations of parts of the world (Giere 1988, 78-86; Giere 1999), or our ob-
servations of the world (van Fraassen 1980, 47). Scientific representation, on the
semantic view, is not a matter of linguistic reference, but instead a matter of two
kinds of objects—non-linguistic structures and phenomena in the world—relating
to each other.
2.2 Representation as an analytical concept in philosophy of
modelling
Since the rise of the semantic view as the dominant analysis of scientific theories in
the 1980’s, the view that the primary function of models is to provide representations
of parts of the world has become mainstream.6 As R. I. G. Hughes remarked,
One major philosophical insight recovered by the semantic view of theories is that the
statements of physical theory are not, strictly speaking, statements about the physical world.
They are statements about theoretical constructs. If the theory is satisfactory, then these
constructs stand in a particular relation to the world. (Hughes 1997, 325.)
The ’particular relation’, to which Hughes was referring, is representation. Furt-
hermore, the above quote illustrates that representation for the semantic view is
more than just a fancy characterisation of models. The notion is intended to help
tions. In the context of economic modelling, Uskali Mäki (2011) has developed a view according to
which models are (abstract) objects and representations (see also Mäki 2009), but can nevertheless
be true about the world.
6The idea that models are first and foremost representations has also been disputed, however.
For instance, Grüne-Yanoﬀ (2014) argues that various models oﬀering how-possibly explanations
(see Forber 2010; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014, Sect. 4; Reiner 1993) may be evaluated without
considering them as representations. Knuuttila (2005) and Kennedy (2012) are other philosophers
who have argued for a non-representational conception of scientific models.
Furthermore, the view that models are representations can be traced further back than the
semantic view of theories (e.g. Boltzmann 1902). However, the semantic view is particularly rele-
vant here because many of its notions still play a role in the present discussions about scientific
representation.
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address problems pertaining to our understanding of theories. One of these problems
is theory evaluation. The intuitively appealing thought here is that if representation
is a concept which captures the essential properties of the relationship between mo-
dels and the world, then we should turn to the analysis of this concept if we are
interested in assessing the relative merits of our theoretical accounts. On the se-
mantic view, theory assessment and evaluation naturally becomes dependent on the
analysis of the representational relation.
Another problem concerning models which has been addressed with the help of
representation is due to the diversity of the kinds of things referred to as models in
science. Indeed, as Nelson Goodman eloquently observes:
Few terms are used in popular and scientific discourse more promiscuously than "model".
A model is something to be admired or emulated, a pattern, a case in point, a type, a
prototype, a specimen, a mock-up, a mathematical description—almost anything from a
naked blonde to a quadratic equation—and may bear to what it models almost any relation
of symbolization. (Goodman 1976, 171.)
Models in science are an undeniably diverse lot that appear in a multitude of
diﬀerent kinds and forms, and that are used for an array of diﬀerent purposes.7 This
diversity of kinds and purposes creates a prima facie need for a general framework
within which the diﬀerences and relations between distinct cases of modelling can be
discussed. Conceiving of models as representations help in building such a unifying
framework, because it can pinpoint a common conceptual ground that all cases of
modelling share (Downes 2011, 760). Thus, what it is to be a model can be explicated
in terms of being a representation. The following quote from Paul Teller illustrates
this approach:
I take the stand that, in principle, anything can be a model, and that what makes a thing a
model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of something by the model
users. Thus in saying what a model is the weight is shifted to the problem of understanding
the nature of representation. (Teller 2001, 397.)
This shift from problems concerning theories and their content to problems about
models as non-linguistic entities, and finally to the rephrasing of these problems as
7For instance, Morrison and Morgan (1999, 18-25) argue that models function as instruments in
theory construction and exploration, measurement, technology design, and as tools of investigation
in empirical research.
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being dependent on the analysis of the concept of representation can be viewed as
the inheritance of the semantic view. This inheritance, however, carries along with it
a burden, also recognized by Teller, that our understanding of models and theorising
comes to be wedded to the analytic understanding of representation. The problem
here is that, as Teller (2001, 397) notes, we do not ’begin to have a workable account
of representation’.
The historical trajectory spanning from the syntactic view of the logical empi-
ricists, through the understanding of models as theory-satisfying structures, and to
the representational view of models thus implies a puzzle, which has later become
known as the problem of representation (e.g. Callender and Cohen 2006; Knuuttila
2005): what does it mean to say that a model represents a part of the world? Until
we can figure out an answer to this question, it seems that our understanding of
modelling is not greatly enhanced by conceptualising of models as representations.
2.2.1 The motivation for deflationism
In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at the problem of representation in
the context of modelling. First, however, I wish to examine briefly two responses to
the problem that have become particularly prominent in the literature—although
their merits are often regarded as meagre. The reason why this is worthwhile is that
the criticism of these two accounts has been one of the primary motivations for the
development of deflationary notions of scientific representation.
The first of these accounts is based on the idea that models represent in virtue
of being structurally isomorphic with that which is represented, where isomorphism
is understood as a structure-preserving bijective mapping between objects in the
model and objects in the represented target. In other words, if there are two objects
in the model with a relation between them, then there must be two objects in the
represented structure with a relation obtaining between them as well, and vice versa.
This kind of an account was popular among the early proponents of the semantic
view, but is most often cited in connection to the constructive empiricist philosophy
of science of Bas van Fraassen (1980, 41-44).
The second account derives in part from a criticism of the isomorphism-based
view. Ronald Giere (1988, 80-81) has argued that in many cases, model-based rea-
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soning cannot be plausibly understood as operating on isomorphic structures. For
this reason, we should relax the condition of representation so that other kind of
likenesses could be taken into account as well. According to Giere (1988, 81; see
also 1999, 44-47), a suitably general notion for analysing the model-world relation
is similarity.8 According to this notion, a model represents a part of the world in
virtue of being similar to it in some relevant respects and degrees. As isomorphism
is in fact a form of structural similarity, the similarity-based view of representation
includes cases based on isomorphism, but is not restricted to them.9
Accounts of representation based on similarity or some related notions of likeness
have long been criticised in the philosophy of art and aesthetics (see Downes 2009).
Nelson Goodman famously argued in his seminal book Languages of Art that the
resemblance-based view of representation—or the ’most naive view of representation’
(Goodman 1976, 3)—fails to satisfy certain core logical properties of the concept,
and thus is inadequate as a general theory of representation. Specifically, while the
relation of similarity is reflexive and symmetric, representation characteristically
lacks both properties (Goodman 1976, 4).10 On the basis of these observations,
Goodman developed an argument to the eﬀect that similarity can neither be a
necessary nor suﬃcient condition for representation (see Goodman 1976, Ch. 1).
It was not until the early 2000’s, however, that the criticism of similarity-based
notions of representation really begun to take bite in the philosophy of science.11 In
8As Suárez (2003, 227) argues, the notion of similarity is a generalisation of the notion of
resemblance, or visual similarity. Both notions are typically understood as being based on shared
properties.
9A further diﬀerence between van Fraassen and Giere is that, while the former is an advocate
of empiricism, the latter defends a position labelled constructive realism. Limitations of space do
not allow me to enter the debates between empiricism and realism here. For a concise general int-
roduction, see Chakravartty (2015). For discussion of issues of realism in philosophy of economics,
see Hausman (1998) and Mäki (2012).
10A relation R is symmetric if, for a pair of relata A and B, it follows from R(A,B) that also
R(B,A), and vice versa. R is reflexive if it is true that R(A,A), for all A in the domain of R. This
same logical argument applies to the relation of isomorphism as well. However, isomorphism is also
transitive, which representation is not. This means that for A, B, and a third relata C, if A is
isomorphic to B and B is isomorphic to C, then A must also be isomorphic to C. See also Goodman
(1972) and Quine (1969) for arguments against similarity based conceptions of representation.
11See, however, Downes (1992), who criticises Giere’s (1988) similarity-based account. Hughes
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2003, Mauricio Suárez launched a heavy attack on the similarity and isomorphism
conceptions of representation, and argued that any theory of representation which
shares their aims is likely to be a non-starter (Suárez 2003, 225-227).12
Suárez (2003) put forward five arguments against the similarity and isomorphism
based views. First, he argued that similarity and isomorphism are not applicable to
all vehicles of representation. Second, they fail to satisfy the logical properties of
representation. Third, both similarity and isomorphism fail to accommodate cases
of misrepresentation. Fourth and fifth, we can come up with clear cases of represen-
tation without either similarity or isomorphism, and vice versa, which means that
neither is a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for representation. (Suárez 2003,
231-237.)
These arguments were well received, and most philosophers today would seem to
agree with the claim that representation cannot be straightforwardly equated with
either similarity or isomorphism.13 Suárez (2003, 225-227), however, held that his
arguments also suﬃce to support a stronger conclusion, namely, that there are no
particular relations or properties obtaining in the world, in terms of which represen-
tation could be given a generally applicable analysis. Suárez (2003, 226-227) labelled
accounts attempting to do so substantive theories of scientific representation, and
argued that we need not commit ourselves to achieving substantivist aims in order
to construct an adequate account of representation. Suárez (2004; 2010; 2015) label-
led such latter kind of accounts, which eschew the aim of analysing representation
in terms of some particular relations obtaining in the world, deflationary theories of
representation.
The motivation for adopting a deflationary account of representation in philo-
sophy of modelling thus derives from a frustration with certain kinds of substantive
answers to the question of how model representation should be analysed. From Suá-
rez’s point of view, deflationism is based on a rejection of those parts of substanti-
(1997), too, was against the idea that representation could be analysed as a similarity relation.
12Roman Frigg (2006) has also argued extensively against the isomorphism based understanding
of representation, as well as the structuralist conception of models.
13However, see Chakravartty (2010) and Poznic (2016) for recent critical accounts.
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vism which purportedly are at the heart of its solution to the problem of represen-
tation. Now, one may wonder, if we reject substantivist solutions to the problem,
then what is the alternative provided by deflationary approaches? In adopting de-
flationism, are we left with a problematic conception of models and modelling, with
no clear resolution to the problem in sight?
2.2.2 Deflationary representation – a useless concept?
The similarity and isomorphism accounts of representation are based on an appea-
ling metaphor: models represent the world in virtue of corresponding to it, or mir-
roring it in one way or another. This approach is appealing because it provides an
analysis of representation in terms of an intuitively understandable notion, a notion
that moreover seems to elucidate the way in which modelling can provide us with
knowledge of the world. By examining a model, we can learn about the part of the
world which it represents because the model is in some relevant manner similar to
that part of the world.
Nonetheless, for the reasons given above, Suárez (2004, 772-773) doubts the help-
fulness of this notion and argues that, in fact, there is no concept embodying the
metaphor of mirroring which could be relied on in providing an analysis of repre-
sentation. Suárez (2004, 771) extrapolates this observation into a generalized scep-
tical attitude towards the aim of providing an analysis of representation in terms of
anything else but its ’most general surface features’. Our theories of representation
are bound to be incapable of providing a solution to the problem of specifying the
nature of model representation if we look at modelling from this standpoint. Repre-
sentation, according to Suárez (2004, 771), is a concept which admits no analysis.
Thus, while substantivist theories take themselves to be in the business of solving
the problem of representation, deflationary accounts rather opt for a dissolution:
according to deflationism about representation, questions concerning representation
in science have not yet been adequately answered because these questions themselves
are not well-posed.
But now an issue emerges for philosophers developing deflationary accounts of
representation. Looking back at the developments following the rise of the semantic
view of theories, the representational conception of models was adopted because
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there was a need to make sense of the way in which the theoretical constructs of
science relate to the empirical reality. As a result of this shift in perspective, many
problems of modelling were recast in representational terms. This is what gave rise
to the problem of representation in the first place. If we accept the deflationary tenet
that model representation cannot be given a definite analysis, then what are we to do
with the problems of modelling to which representation was sought to be a solution?
How should we go about developing a general account of modelling, or conceive of
the relationship of models to the world, or of theory evaluation, if representation is
out of the picture? Is it perhaps so that deflationary theories could still provide us
with some guidance as to how to address such problems?
Not everyone thinks this is the case. For instance, Gabriele Contessa (2007, 61)
has argued that Suárez’s rejection of the aim of analysing the underlying nature
of representation turns model-based reasoning into ’an activity as mysterious and
unfathomable as soothsaying or divination.’ Others have argued that since deflatio-
nism strips representation of its potential to serve as a useful analytical concept,
solutions to modelling problems should be sought from elsewhere. One proposed so-
lution has been to conceive of modelling as a form of extended cognition, or the
inference-making activity of the model-modeller pair (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015;
Kuorikoski 2010; Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009). Another related view is Knuuttila’s
(2005; 2011) account of models as epistemic artefacts, which emphasises the material
and constructed nature of model objects in explicating their epistemic value.
Meanwhile, the development of deflationary theories of representation conti-
nues. Suárez (2015), for instance, seems to hold persistently that the deflationist
approach to representation can bring home important lessons about modelling, with
consequences for both ’philosophy-of-science in practice’ as well as ’philosophy of
science-in-practice’ (Suárez 2015, 47). Yet deflationism was the origin of the idea
that the analysis of representation is an inconsequential exercise. The persistence
of this disparity is what has propelled me to investigate this subject. What can we
learn about modelling by developing a deflationary account of representation?
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3 Surrogative reasoning and the problems of repre-
sentation
In this chapter, I will present a popular conception of modelling that underpins many
accounts that take models to be representation. This view holds that modelling is
essentially an activity of surrogative reasoning, or reasoning about a model system
in order to draw conclusions about a distinct target system. To discuss problems of
representation as they arise in the context of modelling, I will articulate them in
Section 3.1 in terms of the surrogate-system view of models.
In Section 3.2, I will give three brief examples of modelling, which will serve an
illustrative purpose in the exposition of the problems of representation in Section
3.3. Relying on the accounts of Frigg (2006) and Callender and Cohen (2006), I
will divide the problems concerning model representation into ontological, semantic,
and epistemological issues, and discuss the requirements they set for theories of
representation.
3.1 Modelling as surrogative reasoning
Philosophers have often described the epistemic dynamic behind modelling as sur-
rogative reasoning, that is, the examination and manipulation of one object in order
to learn about a distinct target system.14
The notion of surrogative reasoning was introduced into discussions about mo-
delling as representation by Chris Swoyer (1991), who gives the following example
By examining the behavior of a scale model of an aircraft in a wind tunnel, we can draw
conclusions about a newly designed wing’s response to wind shear, rather than trying it out
on a Boeing 747 over Denver. By using numbers to represent the lengths of physical objects,
we can represent facts about the objects numerically, perform calculations of various sorts,
then translate the results back into a conclusion about the original objects. In such cases we
use one sort of thing as a surrogate in our thinking about another, and so I shall call this
surrogative reasoning. (Swoyer 1991, 449. Italics in the original.)
14See e.g. Hughes (1997), Suárez (2004), Contessa (2007), de Donato Rodríguez and Zamora Bo-
nilla (2009), and Mäki (2009). Although Sugden (2000) does not explicitly use the term, he also
views modelling as a process involving the examination and manipulation of one system in order
to learn about a target which is distinct from it.
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As described by Swoyer, surrogative reasoning involves three steps. First, one
thing—a target of interest—is represented using another thing, such as a minia-
ture model or numbers. Second, this representation is examined in order to learn
new things about it. Third, the new things that are learned are ’translated’ into a
conclusion about the target. If this process is successful, we have gained knowled-
ge about the original target of interest without actually having had to engage in a
direct investigation of that very target.15
The notion of surrogative reasoning is relevant for the present topic, because it
is often argued to be one of, if not the main purpose of representation (e.g. Swoyer
1991, 451; Suárez 2004, 769-770; Suárez 2003, 229). At least in the context of science,
it is plausible to claim that one of the main purposes of representing the world
with models is to learn about phenomena in the world. Surrogative reasoning, then,
seems to be an activity which, in the context of scientific modelling, is positively
correlated with representation. Now, one can ask, what is the nature of this link
between surrogative reasoning and representation?
One approach has been to argue that surrogative reasoning, aside from being
the main purpose of representation, is also made possible by the representational
relation between models and the world. In this sense, representation can be said to
explain how surrogative reasoning is possible: scientists can reason about the world
with models in virtue of the fact that models represent the world.16 Thus it is the
concept of representation which should be at the heart of our understanding of how
knowledge claims about the world are grounded in modelling.17
Here we encounter again the problem of representation that was briefly mentio-
15Herein also lies the motivation of surrogative reasoning: models and other systems used for
studying targets separate from themselves are particularly useful when studying the target in a
direct fashion is hard or even impossible. Surrogate systems are usually chosen so that they are
more amenable to investigation than the eventual targets of interest—otherwise, there would be
little point in using them as surrogates in the first place.
16See, for instance, Frigg and Hartmann (2012, Section 3), Contessa (2007), Weisberg (2007),
Godfrey-Smith (2006). Swoyer also thought that structural representation explains surrogative
reasoning.
17As we saw above philosophers who adopt a deflationary conception of representation have often
been critical of the idea that representation could explain surrogative reasoning in this sense (e.g.
Suárez 2003; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015; Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009; Knuuttila 2005).
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ned above in Section 2.2., namely, what does it mean to say that a model represents
a target? If we rely on the concept of representation in our understanding of the
way in which surrogative reasoning works, then our understanding of modelling is
conditional on how well-articulated our conception of representation is in the first
place. But what exactly does it mean that models represent? This question can now
be recast in terms of the view that modelling is surrogative reasoning.
If modelling is understood as the construction and examination of model systems
in order infer conclusions concerning some target of interest, then the way in which
models are about their targets is woven into this inferential practice. That is, to say
that a model represents a target is to say that the conclusions of the surrogative
inferences drawn using the model are about the target in question. Were this not
the case, then the model would not be a surrogate of the intended target, or be
about the target of interest. We can thus rearticulate the problem of representation
as follows: What does it mean to say that surrogative reasoning with the model is
about a target? How can model-based inferences be about parts of the world? The
view that representation can explain surrogative reasoning then holds that theories
of representation can give us an answer to this latter, semantic problem.
However, it is important to note that merely being able to draw inferences on
the basis of a model does not yet mean that the conclusions of those inferences are
true. One motivation that the semantic theorists had for adopting a representational
conception of models what that this conception could possibly be helpful in addres-
sing issues having to do with theory evaluation. On this view, satisfactory theories
are such that their models represent the world in an appropriate manner. This idea
has often been interpreted to mean that, in addition to providing an analysis of
model-based reasoning, theories of representation can also be of help in addressing
the further issue of the epistemic import of modelling. Morrison and Morgan express
the idea as follows:
The critical diﬀerence between a simple tool, and a tool of investigation is that the latter
involves some form of representation: models typically represent either some aspect of the
world, or some aspect of our theories about the world, or both at once. Hence the model’s
representative power allows it to function not just instrumentally, but to teach us something
about the thing it represents. (Morrison and Morgan 1999, 11.)
According to this view, representation can explain not just the way in which models
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allow us to draw inferences regarding certain targets, but also answer the further
question of how surrogative reasoning can lead to new knowledge about the target.
How, then, does the ’representative power’ of models allow this goal to be accomplis-
hed?
So there are at least two distinct kinds of problems that arise when modelling
is conceived of as representing. In Section 3.3, we will examine these distinctions in
more detail. Let us next turn to look at some brief examples of modelling, in order
to get a somewhat more concrete picture of the issues discussed above.
3.2 Some examples of modelling
There are many diﬀerent ways to classify the diﬀerent kinds of models at use in
science. I will here be relying on Michael Weisberg’s (2013, Ch. 2) typology of mo-
dels, which distinguishes between material, mathematical, and computational mo-
dels. The first of these are concrete physical objects, the second abstract mathe-
matical systems, and the third algorithmic processes typically simulated using a
computer. Although very diﬀerent in their make-up, all these diverse kinds of things
can be used for surrogative reasoning about phenomena in the world. How is this
possible? The hope is that a representational conception of models would shed light
on the common characteristics in the seemingly very diﬀerent cases of modelling
that abound in science.
3.2.1 The Newlyn-Phillips machine
The first example I have chosen is a material model designed during 1949-1950 by
Walter Newlyn and Bill Phillips on a commission by the University of Leeds. Ori-
ginally, the model was designed for pedagogical purposes, to be used in classroom
settings to demonstrate the macro-level workings the UK national economy. Howe-
ver, the machine turned out to be a moderate success, and consequently the designs
of its later versions included the possibility to configure the model to correspond to
diﬀerent economic systems as well.18
18For a detailed historical account of the development and theoretical underpinnings of the
machine, see Morgan (2012, Ch. 5).
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The model itself is a concrete object, a hydraulic system composed of pipes
and water containers through which coloured water runs, regulated by a network of
sensors and valves under the control of the modeller. The idea of the model is that the
system of pipes and containers itself is taken to stand for the national economy, while
the water running through the system represents the flow of money in the economy.
The pipes of the system stand for diﬀerent ’directions’ towards which the money can
flow (e.g., taxes or national income). The pipes and containers are connected to the
system of valves that react to the water flow by opening and closing diﬀerent parts of
the system according to controls that can correspond to economic functions. Thus,
the model user can specify beforehand the functions according to which the machine
is supposed to run, and investigate how diﬀerent specifications aﬀect the way in
which ’money’ flows and accumulates within its pipes and containers. (Morgan 2012,
Ch. 5.)
The hydraulic machine is a clear example of a model which can be used for
surrogative reasoning about a system very diﬀerent from itself. Using the machine,
modellers can represent aspects of macro-economies with the help of material objects
which are easily manipulated. By experimenting with diﬀerent model configurations,
the modellers can then infer conclusions which purportedly have a bearing on the
original target of interest.
3.2.2 Hotelling’s linear city model
In 1929, the economist Harold Hotelling proposed a mathematical model of compe-
tition, which he used to derive what has come to be known as ’Hotelling’s law’, or
the principle of minimal diﬀerentiation (e.g. Reiss 2012, 44). The principle states
that competing sellers tend to make their lines of product as similar as possible to
each other, without becoming exactly identical (Hotelling 1929, 54-55).
In presenting the model, Hotelling asks the reader to suppose that the buyers
of a commodity are uniformly distributed along a line, and two sellers A and B are
situated at the opposite ends of the line (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the buyers
are assumed to buy the cheapest commodity they can get in terms of its price plus
distance from the seller, while the sellers are assumed to maximize the profits they
get from selling the commodities. Finally, demand for the commodity is assumed to
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be completely inelastic—that is, not dependent on its price. Thus, the demand for
the commodity will always stay the same, and can be assumed to be equal to the
number of the buyers. (Hotelling 1929, 45.)
Figure 1: Line l of buyers with two sellers A and B
Hotelling then specifies a set of equations, which represent the profits earned
by the two sellers as the function of the prices set for their commodities, as well
as of the distance of the buyers from their respective positions on the line. By
manipulating these equations, he derives the optimal prices for the two sellers, given
their initial locations. (Hotelling 1929, 46-47.) Then, to demonstrate the principle
of minimal diﬀerentiation, Hotelling considers a situation in which A and B are
allowed to move on along the line. The argument here is that each seller will want
to be positioned on the line so that she is the closest seller for as many of the buyers
as possible. (Hotelling 1929, 50-53.)
For instance, if seller B were allowed to move first, the optimal location for her
would be just to the right of A. Then, all the buyers to the right of B will buy
from her, given that her price is equal to that of A, or just a little higher. But if
B moves to that location, then it will be rational for A to move too, with the next
best location being just to the right of B’s new location, and so on. Eventually, the
two sellers will be located next to each other at the line’s centre.
The model can be said to demonstrate that rational sellers of a commodity will
tend to make their products as similar as possible to each other, without becoming
exactly identical. Although customer decisions in the model are determined by prices
and distance from the seller, Hotelling (1929, 45) emphasizes that the latter of these
can be seen to stand for whatever features real customers take into consideration
while choosing between products. This way, the model can be applied to a wide
variety of situations where sellers try to optimize their profits by going as far to
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their competitors’ territories as possible.19
3.2.3 Schelling’s checkerboard model of segregation
Thomas Schelling’s (1971; 1978) checkerboard model of segregation is probably the
most cited example of a computational model in the literature (e.g. Sugden 2000;
Weisberg 2013; Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015; Aydinonat 2007), presumably because
its logic is quite easy to grasp, and it nicely demonstrates the way in which model-
based reasoning can lead to surprising conclusions from non-controversial premises.
The model consists of an 8x8 lattice on which two kinds of agents reside and
move. The idea is to give the agents a rule according to which they react to other
agents of a diﬀerent kind, and examine the behavioural patterns that result. Schelling
famously demonstrated that if the agents are given the rule to change their position
on the lattice if the majority of their immediate neighbours are of a diﬀerent kind
from themselves, then segregated neighbourhoods quickly arise, occupied by agents
of the same kind (Schelling 1971, 158-159). The conclusion from this exercise is that
the agents do not need to strongly avoid having other kinds of agents in their vicinity
for segregation to occur (Aydinonat 2007, 437).
Schelling originally used pen and paper as well as a checkerboard for a lattice and
coins of two colours for the agents to study the results of diﬀerent behavioural rules in
his model (see Schelling 1978, 147-155). Nowadays Schelling-type segregation models
are usually implemented as agent-based simulation models run on a computer.
3.3 The problems of representation
Roman Frigg (2006, 50-51) and Callender and Cohen (2006, 68-70) have usefully dis-
tinguished between diﬀerent versions of the problem of representation in modelling.
Let us now take a closer look at each of these problems, using as an aid the examples
from the previous section. Below, I will distinguish problems concerning representa-
tion into ontological, semantic, and epistemological kinds, and discuss each in turn.
In addition to dealing with these problems, Suárez’s (2003) arguments imply that
19Examples referred to by Hotelling (1929, 54) range from party politics and real-estate markets
to shoe business and religious organizations.
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theories of representation will have to satisfy a set of criteria in order to be adequate.
Let us begin with these criteria, and then move on to the problems of representation.
3.3.1 Four criteria of adequacy for theories of representation
As we saw in the previous chapter, Suárez (2003, 230-237) argued that the iso-
morphism and similarity based accounts of representation are inapplicable to some
cases of representation in science, do not satisfy the concept’s logical properties, ma-
ke misrepresentation impossible, and fail as necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
representation.
On the basis of these arguments, we can discern the following criteria of adequacy
which all theories of representation in science should satisfy. To be tenable an account
of representation should
1. not exclude clear cases of scientific representation;
2. characterize representation in accordance with its intrinsic logical properties
(i.e. nonreflexivity, nonsymmetry, and nontransitivity);
3. allow for misrepresentation;
4. not claim that certain non-necessary or non-suﬃcient conditions are necessary
or suﬃcient for representation.
The first criterion here is the requirement that our purported theory of represen-
tation should not unduly restrict the concept of representation so that cases com-
monly agreed to be representational in science can be accommodated. For instance,
(Suárez 2003, 231-232) argues that representation cannot be equivalent to similari-
ty, because there are cases in which the model clearly is not similar in any relevant
respect to the represented target. This happens for example with mathematical mo-
dels such as Hotelling’s linear city. Mathematical models, (Suárez 2003, 232) claims,
represent phenomena (e.g. competition), but cannot be claimed to be similar to tho-
se phenomena in any relevant respect. Whether this is really the case is debatable
(cf. Chakravartty 2010; Poznic 2016). The point here is just that whatever the con-
tent of our theory of representation, it should be able to accommodate all or most
of the cases in which models function as representations. The second criterion, on
the other hand, is the Goodmanian requirement already encountered above that our
account should accord with the apparent logical properties of representation.
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Underlying the third criterion is the observation that, although a model might
misrepresent its target, it is still a representation, albeit an incorrect one. To be
adequate, then, a theory of representation must make the phenomenon of misrepre-
sentation conceptually possible. Suárez (2003, 233-234) discusses two diﬀerent kinds
of misrepresentation, namely mistargeting and inaccuracy. Mistargeting happens
when a model is taken to represent something that it does not actually represent.
For instance, the Newlyn-Phillips machine could be taken to be a hydraulic mo-
del of the petrol engine, as the system of pipes resembles an engine-like structure.
However, this would be a case of mistargeting, because what the model really repre-
sents is the workings of the macro economy. An adequate theory of representation
should then be able to explain why this is a case of misrepresentation rather than
representation.20
Inaccuracy, on the other hand, is a pervasive feature of representation. For ins-
tance, the Schelling model represents segregation dynamics with the help of a popu-
lation of virtual agents deciding where to reside on a two-dimensional lattice. Real
residential segregation, however, is a phenomenon occurring in real, three dimensio-
nal cities, as a result of complex interconnected causal factors. In the model, these
factors are represented in a very simplified form, or not represented at all. Thus, the
model clearly misrepresents aspects of real-world segregation processes. However, it
would seem incorrect to claim on this basis that the model does not represent segre-
gation. Therefore an adequate theory of representation should be able to explain
how a model can be an inaccurate representation of its target.
The fourth criterion, somewhat overlapping with the first one, is the common-
sensical demand that a theory of representation must give a correct characterisation
of the conditions for the occurrence of representation. The requirement here is that,
for instance, our theory should not claim that mere similarity suﬃces for represen-
tation, as any two objects are similar to each other in a multitude of diﬀerent ways,
even though the objects would not represent each other. Conversely, similarity can
be argued not to be necessary for representation, for the reasons given already in
20As Suárez (2003, 233-234) argues, an account which identifies representation with similarity
would be unable to do so. If mere representation is similarity, then the machine trivially also
represents the petrol engine insofar as it is similar to it.
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connection to the first criterion.
Finally, we are ready to turn to discussing the problems of representation. In
what follows, I will assume that answers to these problems, be they substantivist
solutions or deflationary dissolutions, will have to be given in accordance with the
four criteria of adequacy introduced above.
3.3.2 Model ontology
Questions about the ontology of models are questions concerning the nature of
models qua entities. For instance, in the brief examples above we saw that modelling
can make use of diverse kinds of entities, such as material objects, sets of diﬀerential
equations, and computer programs. What is it, we can ask, that makes all these
diﬀerent kinds of things models in some shared sense?21
According to Frigg (2006, 50), model ontology is the first problem that theories
of scientific representation must come to terms with. Frigg’s point, however, is not
to claim that a theory of representation can provide us with an ontology of models,
in the sense of telling us what model objects fundamentally consist of. The issue
is rather that our theory of representation, if it is to be applicable in the context
of modelling, must be compatible with our best account of model ontology (Frigg
2010, 99). Thus, from the point of view of theories of representation, model ontology
is rather a contstraint than a subject of study: to say that models represent is to
say that certain kinds of objects or entities represent, and thus what is meant by
’represent’ must allow for those kinds of things to be representations.
In this sense, it is a virtue of our theory of representation if it is compatible with
as many diﬀerent ontological views as possible. A theory of representation that is
tied to a particular ontological view is indirectly subject to criticism from alternate
ontological positions: given that some of these alternate views would turn out to be
right, our theory of representation would fall with the failing ontological project.
Many kinds of ontological views have been oﬀered in the literature. Diﬀerent
21It should be noted here that this ontological issue is rarely regarded as pressing in the context
of material models. The ontological puzzles involved with material objects are the same issues that
metaphysics of objects deals with, and thus raise no distinct concerns for the philosophy of science.
(Frigg and Hartmann 2012, Section 2.1.)
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attempts at addressing the issue have conceived of models as set-theoretical struc-
tures (Suppes 1960), trajectories of states in a mathematical space (van Fraassen
1980), abstract objects (Giere 1988), or entities akin to literary fiction (Frigg 2010;
Contessa 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2006). As my primary concern in this thesis is with
theories of representation, I do not wish to take sides in the ontology debate.
However, later on in Chapters 5-6, I will be discussing two accounts of repre-
sentation, namely the inferential conception of representation of Suárez (2004) and
the similarity-based account of Weisberg (2012, Ch. 8; 2012). As both of these aut-
hors maintain the view that models are structures, I will for the purposes of the
discussion below assume this conception. In the light of the points in this section,
then, one question to consider about these accounts of representation is the extent
to which they are tied to the view of models as structures.
3.3.3 Semantics
Semantic problems about representation concern the way in which models can be
thought of as standing in a relation with, or being about some target distinct from
themselves. As we saw above, this problem rises when the relationship of models
to the world is conceived of as representation: What does it mean to say that our
model-based inferences are about parts of the world? The semantic problems of
representation call for an analysis of the concept of representation and the way in
which it applies to modelling.
Frigg (2006, 50; see also Callender and Cohen 2006, 68) argues that there are
two kinds of semantic issues that theories of representation are dealing with in the
context of scientific modelling. The first of these can be well illustrated with the
example of the Newlyn-Phillips Machine.
The hydraulic model consists of a connected set of pipes and water containers,
and is powered by an engine which pumps water through the system. Yet, it purpor-
tedly is a model of the Keynesian economy, which most apparently is not a system
of pipes and containers with water running trough. The intuitive problem arising
here is then this: in what sense can we say that our reasoning about the hydraulic
apparatus can somehow lead to conclusions about any real macroeconomic system?
Put in a general form, this is the problem of representation that we have already
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encoutered above: in virtue of what can we claim that surrogative reasoning with a
model is about a distinct target? Following Callender and Cohen (2006, 68), I will
below refer to this problem as the problem of constitution.
Secondly, Frigg (2006, 50; see also Frigg and Hartmann 2012, Section 1.1) argues
that, apart from the problem of what constitutes representation, there is a distinct
semantic issue concerning the diﬀerent ways of achieving representation in science.
According to Frigg, this problem of style is that
The representations used in the sciences are not all of the same kind either. Bill Phillips’
hydraulic machine and Hicks’ mathematical models both represent a Keynesian economy
but they use very diﬀerent devices to do so...As in painting, there seems to be a variety of
representational styles in science. But what are these styles (or ’modes of representation’)?
A theory of representation has to come up with a taxonomy of diﬀerent styles and provide
us with a characterisation of each of them. (Frigg 2006, 50.)
In a similar vein, the Hotelling linear city model and Schelling’s checkerboard mo-
del can both be claimed to represent mechanisms of behaviour, albeit on a very
abstract level. However, the models are very diﬀerent from each other—Hotelling’s
model being an analytical mathematical model with just two competing actors, whi-
le Schelling models simulate behaviour of a population of virtual agents on a lattice
torus. According to Frigg, then, theories of representation are in the business of
explicating how such diﬀerent styles of representation work, and how they diﬀer
from and relate to each other.
One point that should be emphasised here is that the problem of style is not just
the above-encountered problem of constitution as it is raised for each of the various
kinds of models used in science. Rather, it seems that models belonging to the same
kind can utilise diﬀerent styles of representation with respect to their targets. For
instance, a scale model of an aircraft and the Newlyn-Phillips Machine are both
material models of their targets. However, while the former seems to represent by
being a down-sized copy of the aircraft, there is no obvious way to interpret the latter
case in these terms. Rather, the hydraulic system is more plausibly characterised as
representing the economy by way of being analogous to it.22
22See Frigg and Hartmann (2012, Section 1.1). They argue that there are at least four impor-
tant representational styles at play in modelling, namely scale models, idealized models, analogical
models, and phenomenological models, as well as mixed cases of these categories.
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Frigg (2006, 50-51) also claims that there is a further variant of the problem of
style, which has to do with giving an account of the representational styles that
are acceptable in scientific contexts. For clarity’s sake, I will follow Callender and
Cohen (2006, 68-69) and refer to this variant below with a label of its own, the
problem of demarcation. The issue here is that of giving an account specifically of
scientific representation, which involves a condition that demarcates other kinds of
representational styles from those that are acceptable in science.23
To summarize, the semantic questions concerning model representation involve
three distinct but related problems. Theories of representation can then aim to
provide solutions to the problems of constitution, style, and demarcation, as long as
they satisfy the criteria of adequacy discussed above and are compatible with some
plausible account of model ontology.
3.3.4 The epistemology of modelling
As we have already seen above, epistemic questions are often regarded as central for
theories of representation. Frigg is no exception in this respect, maintaining that
Scientific models represent things in a way that allows us to acquire knowledge about them.
We study a model and thereby discover features of the thing it stands for. Every acceptable
theory of scientific representation has to account for this interplay between knowing and
representing. (Frigg 2006, 51.)
Put in terms of surrogative reasoning, this problem can be framed as that of explai-
ning how the inferences drawn from models can give us knowledge about the targets
they represent. This is what I have above referred to as the problem of epistemic
value of models: how can model-based reasoning attainin knowledge about parts of
the world?
Here it is important to note a distinction emphasized by Contessa (2007, 51)
between valid and sound surrogative inferences. An inference is valid when it is made
in accordance with some set of inferential rules, which prescribe which inferences
are permissible and which are not (Contessa 2007, 61-62). By contrast, an inference
23For instance, one condition often cited is that representations in science are required to be
objective in some sense or another (e.g. Suárez 2004; Contessa 2007). Callender and Cohen (2006)
argue that scientific representation cannot be demarcated from other kinds of representation.
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is sound if it is valid and its conclusion is true. Thus, inferences can be valid without
being sound, but can be sound only when they are first valid.24 (Contessa 2007, 51.)
Now, on the basis of this distinction we can discern two diﬀerent versions or as-
pects of the problem of epistemic value. First, we can ask, how can model-based
inferences be valid? How do we arrive at the rules which ground the validity of our
surrogative reasoning? I will refer to this as the problem of validity. Second, the sa-
me kind of a problem can be posed concerning the grounds for claiming that the
conclusions of model-based surrogative inferences are true. How can the surroga-
tive inferences drawn from models be true about parts of the world? This can be
called the problem of soundness. As Callender and Cohen (2006, 69) caution, these
epistemic problems concerning modelling should not be conflated with the semantic
problems about representation.
What would it then mean for a theory of representation to help solve epistemic
problems concerning models? Broadly speaking, these problems are rooted in the
autonomy and apparent unrealisticness of most theoretical models with respect to
phenomena in the world (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, 3817-18). Theoretical models
are typically constructed by stipulating a hypothetical model system that is not
directly based on empirical data about any observed phenomena (Weisberg 2007;
Godfrey-Smith 2006). The aim here is to capture in an accessible form some general
relationships of dependency that seem to be crucial for understanding a class of
interesting phenomena. The epistemic problems are as follows. If model construction
is a matter of stipulation, not constrained by empirical data, then how should we
decide which set of rules should validate reasoning with models? Moreover, given
24It is important to note here that in logic, the term valid usually means that an inference is
truth-preserving. That is, if an inference is valid, its premisses cannot all be true and its conclusion
false. Contessa’s meaning for validity is diﬀerent from this sense, however. A valid surrogative
inference, for Contessa (2007, 61-62), means that the inference drawn from the vehicle accords to
some rule, which need not guarantee that the inference is truth preserving.
One example of such rules given by Contessa is that if an agent takes it that some object or
feature denotes or stands for some other object or feature, then the agent is allowed to infer that
the denoted feature exists in a target of surrogative reasoning if and only if the denoting feature
exists in the model used for the reasoning (Contessa 2007, 61).
Thus, valid surrogative inferences for Contessa are inferences which accord with denotational
relationships between models and targets. We will return to discuss Contessa’s account of repre-
sentation more closely in the next chapter.
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that a set of rules is established, how do we know that the conclusions of our valid
inferences are true about the world, given that they are based on stipulated and
hypothetical systems?
The second issue above is not made easier by the unrealistic assumptions that
modellers employ in constructing their model systems. Consider the linear city model
as an example. Hotelling constructs the model by presenting a set of theoretical
assumptions which describe a hypothetical situation of competition between two
sellers of a product. For instance, Hotelling (1929, 45) asks the reader to assume
that the buyers of the commodity are uniformly distributed along a line, that each
buyer consumes the commodity at the same constant rate, and that the customer’s
preferences for a seller of the product are determined completely by their distance
from the seller and the price of the product. This is clearly a set of assumptions
which will not be true in a great majority of real cases of competition. Nevertheless,
Hotelling argues that his model can help us understand the phenomenon of product
diﬀerentiation as it occurs in a variety of real-world settings. Unrealistic assumptions
are epistemically problematic because it is unclear how inferences made on the basis
of models incorporating such assumptions can be thought to hold for any phenomena
in the world about which the assumptions are not true.
Moreover, it has been claimed that the very reason why modelling is an eﬀective
theoretical strategy is the autonomous, simple and abstract nature of model systems
(e.g. Morrison and Morgan 1999, 17-18; Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005, Ch. 2). These
characteristics of models seem to be tied to the epistemic value of models, and
therefore an account aiming to make sense of modelling should be able explicate
their role. To claim that an account of representation is able to alleviate epistemic
problems concerning modelling, then, is to claim that it can tell us how the rules
of inference for hypothetical systems are grounded, how these inferences can lead
to true conclusions about the modelled targets, and what the role of unrealistic
assumptions and model autonomy is in surrogative reasoning.
4 Distinguishing deflationism from substantivism
As we saw above, Suárez introduces his deflationism by distinguishing it from subs-
tantivism about representation (Suárez 2015; Suárez and Solé 2006; Suárez 2010;
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2003). Deflationism is thus defined roughly as an approach to theorising about repre-
sentation, which rejects important parts or all of substantivism.25
My aim in this section is to articulate the diﬀerent ways in which this deflatio-
nary rejection of substantivism can be accomplished. I will begin by arguing that
Suárez’s analysis of substantivism is oversimplifies because it ostensibly leaves no
room for pragmatic factors in the analysis of representation. Given that many recent
substantive analyses of representation include the users of representation as crucial
elements in their analysis, so should the formulation of substantivism with which we
contrast deflationism.
I will then distinguish between five diﬀerent forms of deflationism that are ar-
rived at by rejecting various parts of an amended version of substantivism about
representation. What all these forms share is the idea that representation cannot
be given a definition that would give us the meaning of the concept in isolation of
particular contexts in which it is to be applied.
4.1 Substantivism and explanatory definitions
To discuss the diﬀerent forms of deflationism, we must first familiarise ourselves with
what Suárez means by substantive accounts of representation. Suárez’s formulation
25In introducing deflationism about representation, Suárez (2015, 38-40) also draws an analogy
to the discussions of deflationism about truth. I will largely gloss over this analogy in what follows,
for two reasons.
First, we can distinguish between diﬀerent forms of deflationism about representation merely
by contrasting them with the formulation of substantivism. Thus, albeit illuminating, the analogy
to truth is not necessary for characterising the deflationary position. For reasons of space, I will
be focusing on the relation between substantivism and deflationism understood as approaches to
representation.
Second, as Suárez (2015, 38) notes, deflationary accounts of truth take as their starting point
the so-called Disquotational Schema, according to which a statement that ’P’ is true if and only if
P. Deflationism about truth holds, roughly, that the Disquotational Schema exhausts everything
significant that can be said about the property of truth, i.e. that the truth conditions of each
particular statement can be arrived at by disquotation (Stoljar and Damnjanovic 2014, Section 2).
However, it is not clear what the corresponding idea would be in the context of representation.
Although the role the notion of disquotation should play in the analogy between deflationary truth
and representation is an interesting question, it is an issue which I cannot discuss at length here.
See Raatikainen (2006) for a discussion of problems pertaining to the formulation of deflationism
in contrast to substantivism about truth.
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of substantivism consists of three parts, and deflationary theories can be conceived
of as rejections of some combination or all of them. Here my aim is to articulate in
a precise manner what the three parts amount to, so that in the next section I can
discuss their deflationary rejections.
Let us first fix some terminology. I will follow (Suárez 2003, 225-226) in distin-
guishing between the source and the target of representation. The source of repre-
sentation is simply the thing that represents, and the target whatever is represen-
ted. These terms are intended as mere placeholders, so that in principle any kind
of a thing may be the source or the target of representation (Suárez 2010, 91). For
instance, the source can be a painting and the target the person depicted in it.
Alternatively, the source can be an abstract model specified by a set of diﬀeren-
tial equations, and the target a mechanism purportedly operative in some class of
phenomena studied by science.26
Substantive accounts of representation, according to Suárez (2015, 37-38) are
attempts to formulate an ’explanatory definition’ of the concept of representation.
What this means is that substantive accounts define representation in a way that
lets us distinguish between correct and incorrect applications of the concept across
all contexts of interest. In Suárez’s words,
A substantive analysis of some concept X is a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions that
defines the concept and moreover explains its use. The defining conditions of the concept are
thus also conditions for its use, which stipulate under what conditions the concept applies.
(Suárez 2015, 38.)
So the question that interests substantive accounts of representation in Suárez’s sen-
se is this: what are the conditions under which we can correctly claim that some things
are representations and that others are not? Substantivism answers this question by
giving us a definition of representation that lets us draw the line between representa-
tion and non-representation: when confronted with an unclear case of what appears
to be representation, we can recall the meaning of the concept and see whether it
26Suárez (2015, 44) claims that scientific models can represent fictional entities, and that this is
one argument for adopting a deflationary view of representation. The terminology of sources and
targets is suitable here because it does not rule out the possibility of fictional representation in
advance. See the essays collected in Suárez (2009) for discussions concerning the status of fictions
in scientific modelling.
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includes the case at hand. It is in this sense that substantivism aims at a definition
of representation that ’explains the use’ of the concept.27
Not just any sloppy definition of representation will qualify as a substantive
theory, however. In the above quote we can already discern the three requirements
that substantivism demands a definition must meet in order to be explanatory.
First, there is the requirement that a substantive theory provides a ’set of necessary
and suﬃcient conditions’ of representation. This requirement is fulfilled when we
succeed in finding conditions that are present in every case of representation in the
domain of interest (e.g. science), and moreover must be present for representation
to occur. In other words, our conception of representation should apply universally
within the domain that we are investigating (Suárez 2003, 227). Let us call this
the requirement of universality : the conditions identified by a substantive account
should be necessary and suﬃcient for representation to occur.
Second, Suárez (2015, 37) is exclusively interested in reductive formulations of
substantivism, in contrast to non-reductive or primitivist formulations. Reductive
formulations demand that our account of representation be expressed in terms of
non-representational concepts, and thus that our definition should be non-circular.
Primitivism, on the other hand, holds that representation is a primitive concept
which does not lend itself to analysis in terms of non-representational concepts
(Suárez 2015, 37). According to Suárez (2010, 95), substantive accounts of represen-
tation typically tend towards reductivism, motivated by the prospect of deepening
our understanding of the concept with the help of other concepts that can be mo-
re easily grasped (Suárez 2015, 37). Therefore, deflationary accounts are also best
contrasted with reductive formulations of substantivism, and non-representationality
is the second requirement of substantivism: representation should be defined using
non-representational concepts.
Third and finally, the conditions set by a substantive account should enable us to
discern genuine cases of representation from incorrect applications of the concept (i.e.
27Indeed, Suárez (2015, 36 fn. 1) seems to think that this is what accounts of scientific represen-
tation are in the business of doing: they aim to address the ’nature and/or function’ of represen-
tational concepts in science. Substantive accounts are principally in the business of uncovering the
nature of representation in the sense of defining what the concept really means.
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’explain’ the use of representation). This requirement is fulfilled, according to Suárez
(2015, 37; 2010, 94), when we succeed in finding conditions that define representation
in terms of ’substantive’ or ’robust’ properties of or relations between sources and
targets.
Perhaps the clearest statement of what this means can be found in Suárez (2003).
He claims that substantive theories require scientific representation to be treated as
a ’factual relation between entities in the world that can be studied by science’,
the relevant entities being the sources and targets of representation (Suárez 2003,
226). Moreover, he (2003, 226) argues that since ’the relation of representation is
factual it cannot involve essential or irreducible judgements on the part of agents’. I
take this to mean that the ’explanatoriness’ of substantive definitions flows from the
analysis of representation in terms of facts about the world, rather than in terms of
opinions about the world. A definition of representation in terms of facts enables us
to distinguish between correct and incorrect uses of the concept precisely because on
such a view, the meaning of representation is not a matter of opinion, but a fact-of-
the-matter which can be settled by a ’thorough scientific investigation’ (Suárez 2003,
226). Representation, according to substantivism, is not an issue to be determined by
the wishes of anyone, but through the means of empirical investigation. For want of
a better word, I will call this the requirement of factuality : substantivism demands
that representation be treated as a factual relation between objects in the word,
about which we can gain impartial knowledge.28
Putting the three requirements together, substantivism in Suárez’s sense seeks to
define the concept of representation in terms that are universal, non-representational,
28In his most recent statement of deflationism, Suárez (2015, 39 fn. 14) articulates his understan-
ding of substantivism with the help of the disctinction between nominal and real properties. Here,
real properties are those properties that objects have ’independently of how we choose to describe
them’, while nominal properties are those that are due to our characterising them in some manner
(Suárez 2015, 39 fn. 14). Thus, substantive properties of objects would be real properties such as
weight, while non-substantive properties would correspond to nominal properties such as having a
name that begins with a certain character. (Suárez 2015, 39, fn. 14.) Objects have a certain weight
irrespective of what we think about them, but they have names only insofar as we use those names
to refer to them. It seems to me that this point amounts to the same kind of a requirement as
that which I have been describing: substantive properties are matters of fact about objects, whi-
le non-substantive properties are not facts about the objects, but rather views or opinions about
them.
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and that purportedly refer to facts about the sources and targets of representation.
More precisely, the general form of a substantive account of representation may be
stated as follows:
[sub] Source A is a representation of target B if and only if C, where the terms
in C are non-representational and factual.29
I take it that Suárezian deflationism about representation is a position which
rejects all or some parts of [sub]. What kind of a view follows from such a rejection
depends on which parts of the general form are rejected and how.
Before discussing the diﬀerent ways of contrasting deflationism with [sub], howe-
ver, there a clarificatory issue which we should first address. In short, the issue is
this: if substantive accounts demand that ’the relation of representation is factual’
and that it ’cannot involve essential or irreducible judgements on the part of agents’
(Suárez 2003, 226), then are substantive accounts forced to conceive of representa-
tion as a dyadic relation between sources and targets, with no room left for users of
the representations to figure in the analysis? I will argue next that our formulation of
substantivism should allow accounts of representation to include pragmatic factors
pertaining to the use of representations, lest we will end up contrasting deflationism
against a form of substantivism that very few writers today would accept.30
4.2 Are substantive accounts necessarily dyadic?
Let us begin by briefly characterising dyadic accounts of representation, in contrast
with triadic accounts which include the context of use as an element involved in
representation.
Dyadic accounts take it that representation is a relation involving two relata,
29It should be noted here that in characterising substantivism, Suárez does not present a formu-
lation like [sub]. This formulation is rather based on my interpretation of Suárez’s view. I think
that stating the issue in precise terms helps us see what diﬀerent forms a deflationary theory can
take, understood as the rejection of substantivism.
30I thank Professor Petri Ylikoski for comments on early drafts of my thesis which led me into
a consideration of this issue.
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which I have above referred to as the source and the target of representation. On
a dyadic account, the representational relation R between a source S and a target
T can be expressed as having the form R(S, T ). By contrast, a triadic account of
representation has it that the representational relation involves a third element as
well, which is often held to stand for the user or the purpose of the representation. Let
X stand for the ’context of use’ in which S represents T . Then, a triadic formulation
of R will have the form R(S, T,X), where X can include the purposes for which S is
used as a representation, as well as other pragmatic factors pertaining to the ways
in which agents use S to represent T .31
Consider now again the formulation of substantivism from the previous section.
[sub] holds that whether the conditions for a source to represent a target obtain
should not be dependent on judgments on the part of agents. Insofar as this is
accomplished, representation comes to be analysed as a ’factual relation between
entities in the world’ (Suárez 2003, 226). I take this to mean that according to [sub],
our analyses of representation should be exclusively in terms of sources, targets, and
their properties or relations. The purposes of use or any other pragmatic factors
possibly included in X above are out of the substantive picture of representation.
In short, it would seem that substantivism, understood as corresponding to [sub],
would tie us to a dyadic understanding of representation.32
Now why should this be a problem? Suárez is a defender of the deflationist posi-
31Accounts of representation can of course include more than three relata in their characterisation
of the representational relationship. Often the additional elements result from specifying further the
factors pertaining to the context of use. For instance, Giere (2004, 743) analyses representation as
a four-place relationship involving a source, a target, an agent, and the purposes of representation.
Mäki (2009, 32-34) goes even further and argues that model-based representation involves two
additional elements still, namely, the audience of modelling and the model commentary. Thus,
Mäki’s (2009) MISS (Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems) account of modelling
analyses model representation as consisting of six relata. See Lehtinen (2012) for a discussion of
the MISS account and its role in Mäki’s project of formulating a realist philosophy of economics.
32In a similar vein, Suárez (2015, 37-38) seems to be of the opinion that it is an emphasis on the
scientific practice in characterisations of representation that sets deflationary accounts apart from
substantivism. What exactly he means by ’practice’ here is unfortunately obscure. In any case, my
impression is that according to deflationism in the scientific context, the ways in which scientists
construct and reason with models (i.e. the ’model-building practice’) is somehow central to our
understanding of the concept of representation (Suárez 2015, 37-38). It is this ’somehow’ that I
am here trying to clarify.
36
tion and, as we saw in Chapter 2, he has propounded powerful arguments against the
substantive accounts of representation that are based on similarity or isomorphism
(Suárez 2003). These accounts are dyadic in holding that representation can be re-
duced to a self-standing relation between sources and targets, and it is precisely for
this reason the accounts fail to secure the logical properties and directionality that
seem to be intrinsic to representation (Goodman 1976, Ch. 1). So it seems that Suá-
rez is right in rejecting the analyses of representation traditionally associated with
the semantic view of theories, as they are dyadic in nature and thus inadequate as
general theories of representation.
The problem here is the following: it seems that contemporary proponents of
substantivism about representation hold accounts that are not dyadic, but crucially
involve the users of representation in their analyses. Two cases in point are Contessa
(2007) and Weisberg (2013), who Suárez (2015, 37) claims are both recent ’cham-
pions of substantive accounts’. However, an integral element in Contessa’s (2007, 57)
analysis of representation is interpretation on part of the agent who uses a source to
represent a target. Likewise, one of the main points of Weisberg’s (2013, Ch. 8; see al-
so 2012) weighted feature matching—a similarity-based analysis of representation—
is that the similarities between model sources and modelled targets are assessed for
their relevance on the part of modellers.33 Weisberg (2013, 20) even states explicitly
that one of the main aims of his account is to understand the role that the modellers’
intentions play in science. Thus, it seems that Suárez’s champions of substantivism
are putting forward triadic accounts of representation which are at tension with our
formulation of [sub].34
This forces us to ask: does the third requirement of factuality included in [sub]
restrict substantive accounts in an unfair way? What we want is to articulate a
formulation of substantivism such that interesting deflationary positions could be
distinguished as those accounts that reject its tenets, but also such that room would
be left for theories of representation that are genuinely substantivist while being able
33We will look at Weisberg’s account of similarity in greater detail in the next chapter.
34Arguably, there are some substantivist views which can be interpreted as dyadic accounts of
representation (e.g. Giere 1988; van Fraassen 1980; French 2003).
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to appreciate the importance of pragmatic factors in the analysis of representation.35
From the perspective of substantivism, a deflationary attack against merely dyadic
accounts commits the straw man fallacy, which we should take care to avoid.
I think that one way out of this situation is to recognise that there can be facts
about practices, too. Then, we can qualify [sub] so as to allow substantive accounts to
include elements of practice in their definitions, insofar as these elements provide us
with a definition of representation which can be used to distinguish between merely
apparent and genuine cases of representation. For this solution to work, however,
one would have to specify what it means for there to be a fact about a practice.
I will discuss this issue here briefly, in order to be able to distinguish deflationism
from substantivism. A more detailed consideration of how tenable this solution is
will be taken up in Section 5.2.2, when discussing the substantivism of Weisberg’s
account.
Contessa’s interpretational conception of representation provides a good illustra-
tion of this point.36 According to this view, a source represents a target if an only
if a user adopts an interpretation of the source in terms of the target (Contessa
2007, 57). Interpretation, on the other hand, means roughly that the user takes pro-
perties and features of the source to denote properties and features of the target.37
Thus, interpretation is a partition of the source and the target so that the partitio-
ned elements which belong to the source are taken to denote elements belonging to
35As Contessa (2007, 53 fn. 6) remarks, that representation is at least a triadic relation is widely
accepted in the literature on scientific representation.
36To be precise, on Contessa’s terminology, the interpretational conception is an account of
epistemic representation, which is a special case of a more general notion of representation (Contessa
2007, 52-56). An account of epistemic representation is aimed at solving the problem of validity in
addition to the semantic problem of what constitutes representation.
37Denotation is traditionally understood as the relation of a sign to what it stands for. Contessa
(2007, 52) assumes that one thing may denote another thing merely in virtue of a group of user’s
agreeing that it does so. For instance, the logo of the London Underground denotes the London
Underground network because it is conventionally taken to be a sign for it.
Contessa’s account is a substantive version of Suárez’s (2004) inferential conception of represen-
tation, which will be introduced in the next chapter. Suárez’s account, on its part, is a development
of R. I. G. Hughes’ (1997) DDI account of representation, according to which model representa-
tion is constituted by denotation of the target with the model, demonstrative inferences using the
model, and interpretation of the consequences of those inferences in terms of the target.
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the target. (Contessa 2007, 58.) Contessa emphasises that sources are always repre-
sentations in this sense only relative to some user who adopts the interpretation
(Contessa 2007, 53). Thus, the account is explicitly triadic in that it involves a user
whose activities are included among the defining conditions of representation.
The important thing to note here is that there is always a matter of fact to
be determined whether a source represents a target in the above sense. We can
legitimately ask about any object, whether a user has interpreted it in terms of
some target or not. And if a user can be found who indeed does take parts of the
object in question to stand for a target, then the object is a representation for that
user. Moreover, if no interpreting user is to be found, then the object does not
represent anything. As Contessa (2007, 53) maintains, nothing represents anything
else merely in virtue of being an object. Rather, on this account, objects are turned
into representations precisely by the judgement of a user to take that parts of the
object to denote parts of another object. Thus, we should not take the requirement
of factuality included in [sub] to exclude pragmatic factors, such as the judgments
of users.
The relevant issue of factuality for substantivism, then, is that the definition
of representation specifies a matter of fact which can be investigated to determine
whether representation obtains or not. The position need not be committed to the
claim that these facts should exclude the activities and practices of users. Rather,
the important thing is that the fact is precisely enough specified by the theory of
representation so that the theory alone can let us distinguish between representation
and non-representation. Here, then is an amended formulation of substantivism:
[sub*]: Source A is a representation of target B if and only if C, where the terms
in C are non-representational, factual, and can involve pragmatic factors.
This formulation still rules out accounts which hold that representation cannot be
defined so as to make it an objective fact dependent on universal conditions. It is this
amended version of substantivism against which we will next contrast deflationary
accounts of representation.
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4.3 Deflating representation
Recall from Section 4.1.1 the question that substantive accounts of representation
are interested in answering: what are the conditions under which we can correctly
claim that some things are representations and that others are not?
Now deflationism about representation—understood as the rejection of substan-
tivism of the form of [sub*]—can too be seen as an attempt at providing an answer
to this question. However, instead of trying to solve the problem posed by the ques-
tion (i.e. what is representation? ), deflationism adopts the view that the problem
is ill-posed and should rather be dissolved. According to (Suárez 2015, 38), defla-
tionism dissolves the problem by emphasising that representation has an ’essential
link to practice’ that ’makes a substantial definitional approach helpless or impos-
sible’. The upshot of this move is that our answer to the above question is bound
to be inconclusive, or even worse, useless.38 As Suárez maintains, on a deflationary
account
...the analysis of the concept of representation, even where feasible, cannot determine its
conditions of application, and therefore cannot explain its use. These conditions concern the
means of representation—and these are essentially plural and context-dependent. (Suárez
2015, 47.)
My aim here is to distinguish clearly the diﬀerent ways in which this deflationary
dissolution can be achieved. Before this can be done, there are two issues that require
consideration. First, as I argued in the previous section, substantive accounts too can
include elements of practice. Therefore, we must examine further what Suárez means
by the ’essential link’ that, according to deflationism, obtains between representation
and scientific practice.
Second, in the quote above, Suárez claims that on a deflationary account, the
conditions of application of the concept of representation ’concern the means of
representation’, which are ’plural and context-dependent’. By this, he refers to a
distinction he makes between the means and constituents of representation (Suárez
38In addition to his own inferential conception of representation (Suárez 2004), Suárez (2015,
37) claims that accounts of scientific representation that are deflationist in this sense include at
least those of Giere (2004), van Fraassen (2008), and Hughes (1997)—albeit the last one requires
some modifications to qualify as deflationary (Suárez 2015, 43-45).
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2003, 230; 2010, 93). To grasp Suárez’s undestanding of deflationism, then, we should
begin by unpacking this distinction.
Briefly put, any relation between a source S and a target T forms the constituents
of representation if its obtaining is necessary and suﬃcient for S to represent T
(Suárez 2003, 230). In other words, the constituents of representation are relations
between a source and a target, which together amount to a definition of the concept
of representation. These relations, I have argued, can involve the users of the sources
and their activities.39 Thus, a specification of the constituents of representation
amounts to a solution to the problem of constitution of representation (see Chapter
3) in that it tells us the elements which will have to obtain for the concept of
representation to apply. In eﬀect, constituents tell us the meaning of the concept of
representation.
By contrast, a relation between source S and target T is a means of representa-
tion of T by S if that relation is actively considered in an inquiry into T by S (Suárez
2003, 230). Another way of putting this would be that S represents T by means of
similarity if the similarity between S and T is actively considered by someone in an
inquiry about T . Alternatively, S can represent T by means of an interpretation by
an agent if the agent actively considers that interpretation in an inquiry about T .
The important diﬀerence between the means and constituents of representation
is that while the constituents are universal and thus provide a definition of represen-
tation, the means are particular and vary from context to context (Suárez 2010, 93).
Diﬀerent users may use diﬀerent means of representation at diﬀerent times and with
diﬀerent sources, but the constituents must be present for representation to occur.
Thus, substantive accounts of representation can be understood as being primarily
interested in uncovering the constituents of representation, while deflationism insist
that there are no constituents to be found that would tell us what representation
amounts to, across all contexts. Rather, as Suárez maintains in the quote above, de-
flationism holds that the conditions of application of the concept of representation
39Suárez (2010, 93, see also fn. 6) seems to agree that the constitutive relation between a source
and a target can involve ’additional elements’ apart from the source and target themselves. I have
taken this to mean that the source and target can be related by way of pragmatic factors, e.g. if
the source is interpreted in terms of the target.
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are tied to the means of representation, which are ’plural and context-dependent’.
According to deflationism, then, the concept of representation is correctly applied
whenever some relation between a source and a target is considered in order to
learn about the target. Which relation is responsible for representation in each case,
however, we cannot know in advance.
On this characterisation, it would seem that deflationism amounts to the view
that there are no constituents of representation, i.e. that no definition can be given
of the concept of representation. The matter is not as simple as that, however, given
that Suárez (2015, 39) seems to think that some forms of deflationary accounts do in
fact define representation. Rather, to remain deflationist, such accounts are required
to formulate the definition in a way that fails to specify universal conditions for the
correct application of the concept. This is where the ’essential link’ to practice comes
in.
I my view, what Suárez (2015, 37-38) means by the link between deflationary
representation and practice corresponds roughly to the denial of the requirement of
factuality discussed in the previous two sections. Here’s my understanding of what
this denial amounts to. I take it that a condition in terms of which representation is
defined is factual if it corresponds to a state of aﬀairs which is robust with respect
to diﬀerent views about it. Factual conditions are such that we can look at things
in the world, e.g. models, targets, and the activities of scientists, and claim whether
the conditions apply to them. Non-factual conditions, on the other hand, are such
that they do not tell us how things in the world should be like in order for them to
be satisfied.
The interpretational account of representation again provides a good illustration.
Contessa’s (2007, 58) definition of interpretation is factual because on it, whether
a user takes parts of some source to denote parts of a target does not depend on
whether the user thinks she does so. Indeed, as Contessa (2007, 58, see also fn.
10) argues, a user can adopt an interpretation of a source in terms of a target
unconsciously, or without being able to spell out what the interpretation in fact
is. Moreover, these situations can be reconstructed as involving representation in
Contessa’s interpretational sense, because the conception provides us with a factual
condition with which to evaluate them (Contessa 2007, 58). So the condition of
interpretation provides a tool with which to decide whether a case really qualifies
42
as representation or not, irrespective of what the interpreter herself thinks.
Contrary to this, a non-factual condition of representation would be such that
whether the condition is satisfied is dependent on what the users of the representa-
tion think about the matter. When representation is defined in non-factual terms,
the definition alone does not tell us the meaning of the concept. Rather, the meaning
of representation can only be determined by investigating the meanings attached to
the concept in the various contexts in which it is used.
Thus, Suárez (2015, 38) argues that, on a deflationary account, the meaning of
the concept of representation in any given context of practice is ’fully informed’ by
that practice. If by ’practice’, in a scientific context, we mean the construction of
and reasoning with models, then the deflationary thought seems to be that the way
in which modellers conceive of their models and ways of using them constitutes the
meaning of the concept of representation. Thus, the scientists’ conceptions are what
tells us what representation means in a given context of interest, rather than facts
about objects or the ways they are used in that context. This is what I take Suárez
to mean when he claims that
...it is impossible, on a deflationary account, for the concept of representation in any area
of science to be at variance with the norms that govern representational practice in that
area. Rather, representation in that area, if it is anything at all, is nothing but that practice.
(Suárez 2015, 38, italics in the original.)
This is the essential link to practice that I take to be central to Suárezian de-
flationism: the meaning of the concept of representation in any area of science is
constituted by the norms governing the conceptions about representation of the
scientists working in that area. Furthermore, as the way in which we can find out
about these norms is by studying the conceptions of scientists, representation does
not reduce to any robust fact about the world, but rather has to be analysed as a
view about the world, an irreducible judgment on part of the agents using model
sources to represent modelling targets.
Finally, we are in the position to lay out the diﬀerent ways in which deflationary
accounts of representation can be distinguished from substantivism. As I have main-
tained here, generally speaking deflationism amounts to the rejection of one or more
of the requirements that [sub*] places on the conditions of representation, namely
universality, non-representationality, or factuality.
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However, Suárez (2010, 94-95; 2015, 37) argues that the requirement of non-
representationality more or less coincides with the requirement of factuality so that
accounts fleshed out in terms of factual or ’robust’ properties or relations will usual-
ly be reductive, while accounts which reject factuality will typically tend towards
primitivism. For this reason, to simplify the presentation, I will below assume that
if the terms in which representation is analysed are factual, then they should also be
non-representational. If factuality is discarded, on the other hand, then the terms
can be either representational or non-representational.
So we are left with three options: 1) reject universality, 2) reject factuality, 3)
reject both. Of these, universality can be rejected in two distinct ways, as we can
hold that there are either no necessary or no suﬃcient conditions for representation.
Thus we have in total five forms of deflationism, which are summarised below. I will
refer to these formulations as [defl1] through [defl5].
[defl] Source A is a representation of target B
1. if C, where the terms in C are factual.
2. only if C, where the terms in C are factual.
3. if and only if C, where the terms in C are not factual.
4. if C, where the terms in C are not factual.
5. only if C, where the terms in C are not factual.
What all these formulations have in common is that on either one, our conception of
representation can never tell us beforehand which facts about a given case of interest
will be responsible for representation. That is, according to deflationism, represen-
tation either has no constituents but only means, or the constituents themselves will
not be helpful in determining what representation amounts to in any given scientific
context.
For instance, suppose that we are developing a theory of representation which
should help us understand the way in which mathematical models represent their
targets. According to [defl1] and [defl2], there may be some facts about the models
themselves or the ways in which modellers construct and reason with them, which
can help us develop our theory. In particular, [defl1] holds that given a case of
mathematical modelling, if one of these facts occurs, then we have representation.
44
However, there might be a multitude of other, distinct factors which also suﬃce for
representation, and the only way to determine which ones should appear on our list
is to study modelling case-by-case. On the other hand, [defl2] holds that while some
relations or properties of models and targets, or some ways of reasoning about them,
might be necessary for representation, our theory of representation cannot tell us if
these features also suﬃce. Again, a piecewise investigation of modelling is required.
[defl3] through [defl5] perhaps amount to accounts which are more genuinely
deflationist in Suárez’s sense of the term. The reason for this is that all these for-
mulations require that our conception of representation can only be informed by
the ways in which groups of practicing scientists conceive of their own practices. To
visit very briefly the analogy between deflationary accounts of truth and represen-
tation, Suárez (2015, 38-40) argues that in the literature on truth, three forms of
deflationism can be discerned.
The first one, labelled the ’no-theory theory’ by Suárez (2015, 39), stems from
the work of Frank Ramsey (1927) and holds that truth possesses no necessary and
suﬃcient conditions because it does not correspond to a substantive property. This
notion then roughly matches either [defl4] or [defl5] on my list. The second type of
deflationism Suárez (2015, 39-40) presents is due to Crispin Wright’s (1992) concep-
tion of truth as an abstract concept with necessary and suﬃcient conditions, but
which needs to be supplemented with information about context-dependent norms
to provide an explanation of its particular uses. This form of deflationism then could
perhaps be taken to correspond to [defl3]. Third, Suárez (2015, 40) argues that in
the work of Paul Horwich (1998b; 1998a) we can find a deflationary conception of
truth according to which the meaning of truth is entirely given by the uses to which
the concept is put in various diﬀerent contexts. In any given context, the way in
which the concept is used suﬃces to give its meaning. This view seems to accord
with [defl5].
On all these formulations, to grasp what representation is, we should try to deve-
lop an understanding of representation that is based on the conceptions of scientists,
and the norms that appear to govern their ways of thinking and acting. An account
of representation thus formulated regards the factual relations and properties of
sources and targets as inconsequential for the analysis of the concept of representa-
tion.
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However, this should not be taken to mean that considerations of particular
sources and targets, and of the diﬀerent ways they are used, would be unimportant
for the study of modelling. On the contrary, on a deflationary account, the study of
these aspects is of utmost importance precisely because our conception cannot give
us a priori conditions for identifying representation. The point is that if we want
to know what representation means in any given context of science, then we will
have to study the ways in which scientists act and think. This does not mean that
facts about models, targets, and practices would not matter, but that they do not
constitute the universal conceptual content of representation.
5 Two accounts of representation
In this chapter, I will introduce the inferential conception of representation by Suá-
rez (2004) and the weighted feature matching account of Weisberg (2013; 2012), and
argue that we can view them as deflationist and substantivist theories of represen-
tation, respectively, using the distinctions from the previous section. Let us begin,
then, with examining the inferential conception and the way in which it could be
taken to be a deflationary account.
5.1 The inferential conception of representation
Suárez (2004) presents his inferential conception of representation explicitly as an
alternative to the isomorphism and similarity based accounts of representation that
he argues are inadequate as general theories of representation (Suárez 2003). Suá-
rez (2004) argues that the inferential conception avoids the criticisms that render
those two accounts untenable, and simultaneously ’captures the objectivity of the
cognitive representations used by science’, ’sheds light on their truth and complete-
ness’, and ’explains the source of the analogy between scientific and artistic modes
of representation’ (Suárez 2004, 767).
So, on the face of it, Súarez seems to think that the inferential conception is able
to meet many of the pressing problems of representation that we discussed in Chapter
3. At the same time, however, Suárez propounds the inferential conception as a
deflationary account of representation par excellence (Suárez 2015, 45-47). Thus, this
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account provides us with a good example of a deflationary theory which explicitly
aims to be helpful in understanding crucial aspects of scientific modelling, such as
the objectivity and truth of models.
5.1.1 Representational force and surrogative reasoning
The main point of Suárez’s inferential conception is to provide an account of repre-
sentation which is generally applicable and incorporates the elements minimally
necessary for representation to occur in science. At the same time, the account
should avoid the criticisms that the similarity and isomorphism accounts fall prey
to.
To meet these requirements, Suárez (2004, 768) argues that a theory of repre-
sentation must minimally make ’explicit what I call the representational force of a
source, or ’its force’ for short.’ The force of a source
...is the capacity of a source to lead a competent and informed user to a consideration of
the target. Force is a relational and contextual property of the source, fixed and maintained
in part by the intended representational uses of the source on the part of agents: No object
or system may be said to possess representational force in the absence of any such uses.
(Suárez 2004, 768.)
On the inferential conception, this representational force is the first condition
of representation. To give an illustration of the notion, consider the examples of
modelling introduced in Chapter 2. For instance, Hotelling’s linear city model can
be viewed as a mathematical structure described using a set of equations. These
equations describe the relationships between parameters such as the locations of the
sellers of a product, the product’s price, and the cost of travelling for customers see-
king to buy from a seller. So the source of representation in the case of the linear
city model may be said to be the mathematical structure described by the diﬀe-
rential equations specified by Hotelling. Similarly for the Newlyn-Phillips machine
and Schelling’s model. The machine easily lends itself to be viewed as a structure
of pipes and containers, which together constitute the source of representation. Li-
kewise, the Schelling model is a structure of lattice cells and agents with explicit
neighbourhood relations to each other.
The point about representational force is that, in each of these cases, the struc-
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ture of the model in itself does not yet represent anything.40 Rather, the models can
be taken to represent their targets only insofar as they lead a ’competent and infor-
med user’ to consider those targets. Presumably, the users that Suárez has in mind
here are the scientists who construct and analyse models in order to understand
the world. Thus, according to this condition, a mathematical structure represents
the dynamics of competition, and a hydraulic system represents Keynesian econo-
my, and agents moving on a simulated checkerboard represent segregation processes
only insofar as economists, sociologists, and other social scientists judge them to do
so.
According to Suárez (2004, 771-773), however, for a representation to qualify as
scientific, more must be required than the judgements of its users. Representations
used in science, Suárez (2004, 772) argues, diﬀer from representations achieved by
mere stipulation because they have cognitive value in that they provide their users
with information about their targets ’which could not equally be conveyed by any
other arbitrarily chosen sign.’41 Suárez (2004, 773) argues that this cognitive value of
scientific representations can be best characterised by turning ’to the second surface
feature of scientific representation, that is, its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning.’
Thus conceived, scientific representations are cognitively valuable because they al-
low their users to draw specific inferences regarding their targets—that is, inferences
which would not have been possible with just any arbitrarily stipulated sign (Suá-
rez 2004, 772-773). Taken together, the condition of representational force and the
condition of surrogative reasoning form two necessary conditions for representation,
which constitute the inferential conception of representation:
40Frigg (2006, 53-59; see also Frigg 2002) has argued emphatically against the view that structures
represent. Suárez (1999) explicitly claims that the structuralist view of models associated with the
semantic view is lacking in that it does not wed representation with pragmatics.
41Stipulative representation happens, for instance, in natural languages when a word is asserted
to stand for some kind of an object. Here, there need not be any guarantee that the word con-
veys any information about the object. Another case of stipulative representation is Contessa’s
(2007) example of London Underground logo which we encountered in the previous chapter. It is
noteworthy that the condition of representational force in fact requires more than mere stipulation,
however, as the users of the representation are required to be competent and informed. We will
return to this point towards the end of this section as well as in the next section.
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[inf] A represents B only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B,
and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding
B. (Suárez 2004, 773.)
Here, A is the source and B the target of representation. Suárez (2004, 773) emp-
hasizes that the inferential conception can be viewed as an open scheme designed to
make sure that our characterizations of scientific representation meet the necessary
requirements, but do not make too bold claims about the essential nature of repre-
sentation which would lead them into trouble. The inferential conception thus aims
to be an abstract description of the ’most general features’ of scientific representa-
tion (Suárez 2004, 771). Nevertheless, the scheme nevertheless seems to make some
claims about what representation in science is.
First, as the name of the account suggests, [inf] rests on the assumption that
our characterizations of scientific representation should be fleshed out in terms of
the inferential activities of modellers, rather than something else that they do.42
For instance, according to [inf], the linear city model represents competition only
insofar as it allows modellers to draw inferences in the model which can be claimed
to be about competition. In this case, the condition is fulfilled as Hotelling exa-
mines and manipulates the model’s equations to derive the principle of minimum
diﬀerentiation, starting out from a set of specified assumptions. On the inferential
conception, it is precisely this kind of inference-making in using the model, which
helps in distinguishing between scientifically interesting representations and stipu-
lative representation, and in grounding the cognitive value of those representations.
Second, on the inferential conception, a model need not actually be used to
draw inferences in order for it to represent a target (Suárez 2004, 774-775). Rather,
representations must only allow competent and informed agents to draw inferences
about their targets.43 For this to be possible, the inferential activities of modellers
42For example, scientific representation could alternatively be characterised in terms of con-
structing the model or presenting the model-results for an audience. This is not to say that model
construction and the presentation of results could not be relevant for representation in some ca-
ses, but just that the inferential conception does not require that those activities are present for a
model to represent.
43Suárez (2004, 770) criticises Hughes’ (1997) DDI account of representation for making it a
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are required to be constrained by the internal structure of the source so that their
possibility depends on that structure (Suárez 2004, 774-775). This is what Suárez
means by the claim that the inferences enabled by scientific representations are
specific to those representations. For a model to represent, the inferences that the
model allows must be such that they would not have been possible without the
particular internal structure of the model. Furthermore, for a model to allow some
particular inferences, its internal structure must be such that some set of rules
licences those inferences, on the basis of the model’s structure. Otherwise, it would
be hard to say what it means for the model to ’allow’ those inferences.44
Third, not just anyone’s judgement suﬃces to ground representation. The con-
dition of representational force assumes that there is a criterion or a norm in place,
which determines when a user is competent and informed enough to use a source
to represent a target. In science, presumably, this norm is based on the education
and academic merits of the modellers, but also on their awareness of theoretical
principles that are generally accepted within their scientific communities. It seems
to me that in itself, this requirement alone is suﬃcient for drawing a distinction
between stipulative representation and representations that are used in science, but
only at a superficial level. Representational force alone does not suﬃce to consti-
tute an adequate account of representation, if that account aims further to give a
criterion of adequacy for representation in science, rather than just to give a list
of the diﬀerent representations at play in various scientific disciplines. Such a crite-
rion, then, can be seen as providing a tool for comparing the representations used in
science, as well as for explaining why they deserve the label ’scientific’. I will return
to this issue in the next chapter, when discussing the problem of demarcation in
connection to the inferential conception.
Thus, according to [inf], representation in science is minimally a rule-governed
requirement of representation that demonstrations are actually carried out using models. It is
not clear, however, whether Hughes really thinks that actual demonstration is a requirement of
representation.
44What exactly it means to say that the rules are based on the model’s structure is an issue that
will be discussed in the next section. As it will turn out, this question is crucial for determining
the deflationary status of the inferential conception.
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inferential activity of competent and informed modellers, which is made possible by
the internal structure of models. Before looking at how this conception fares in dea-
ling with the problems of representation, we will first need to get clear about how,
and moreover whether, the inferential account is a deflationist theory of representa-
tion.
5.1.2 The deflationism of the inferential conception
Suárez (2015, 45) argues that the inferential conception is a ’straightforwardly de-
flationary’ account of representation, according to any of the senses of deflationism
that he distinguishes. However, on various occasions, Suárez presents diﬀerent for-
mulations of the inferential conception, and not everyone thinks that the account’s
deflationary status is straightforwardly clear. For instance, Contessa (2007, 62-65)
has argued that the two necessary conditions included in [inf] are in fact jointly
suﬃcient conditions for representation in science.
At times, Suárez himself suggests that one acceptable interpretation of the in-
ferential conception is to view its conditions as individually necessary and jointly
suﬃcient for representation in science (Suárez and Solé 2006, 41). On the other
hand, originally in presenting his account, Suárez (2004, 776) maintains that ’the
inferential conception is deflationary and does not lay down a suﬃcient condition
for the applicability of the concept of representation.’ Therefore, on the face of these
disparities, in order to use the inferential conception as an example of a deflationist
account of representation we must first determine its deflationary status. This is
where the schemes of deflationism developed in the previous chapter become useful.
To begin, it should be noted that Suárez intends the inferential conception to
be a universally applicable account of scientific representation. As was mentioned
above, this can either be taken to mean that the conditions of representation laid
down by [inf] are necessary in each case of representation in science, or that they
together constitute necessary and suﬃcient conditions for scientific representation.
Thus, the relevant forms of deflationism for the inferential conception are the second,
third, and fifth schemes presented in Section 4.3, namely
(a) A represents B only if C, where the terms in C are factual.
(b) A represents B if and only if C, where the terms in C are not factual.
51
(c) A represents B only if C, where the terms in C are not factual.
To claim that the inferential conception is a deflationary account of representa-
tion, according to the schemes I have distinguished, the conception can be taken as
formulating necessary and suﬃcient conditions for representation only if the con-
ditions themselves are not factual. If the conditions turn out to be factual, on the
other hand, then they must be interpreted as being merely necessary conditions for
representation.
In developing his substantivist version of the inferential conception, Contessa
(2007, 62-65) argues rather convincingly that to claim that surrogative reasoning
and representational force do not constitute a jointly suﬃcient condition for scientific
representation, one would have to be able to produce an example where a model
used in surrogative reasoning does not represent the target of that reasoning. Lacking
such an example, my strategy here will be to assume for the sake of argument that
Contessa is correct, and that representational force and surrogative reasoning are
jointly suﬃcient for representation. Then, to claim that the inferential conception
is a deflationary theory, we will have to argue that these conditions are not factual,
that is, do not define representation in terms that are independent of the modellers’
conceptions. Thus, I will argue here that we can at least understand as deflationist—
according to scheme (b) above—the following version of the inferential conception
[inf*] A represents B if and only if (i) the representational force of A points
towards B, and (ii) A allows competent and informed agents to draw specific infe-
rences regarding B.
Whether the inferential conception’s conditions really are suﬃcient for representa-
tion is then an issue to be decided separately.
Looking back to our discussion in the previous section, we identified scientific
representation according to the inferential conception as a rule-governed inferential
activity of competent and informed modellers made possible by the internal structure
of models. Here, representational force brings the requirement that modellers be
competent and informed, while surrogative reasoning requires that the models have
structure which allow them to be used to draw specific inferences regarding the
modelled targets. To qualify as non-factual, these conditions would have to be such
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that, upon inspecting a case of purported representation in science (such as the use
of a simulation model to reason about segregation), we could not determine what
representation in the given context means by reference to them alone. Rather, to
determine what representation means in any given case at hand, we would have to
investigate the norms operative in the wider scientific context of which the case is a
part.
Consider now the condition of representational force. This condition requires
that some competent and informed users take the source to represent the target.
However, as Suárez argues, the condition
...leaves open the issue of how many agents are required in a scientific community to fix the
representational force of a source, and what the structure of the community and its practices
ought to be in order to determine this force. (Suárez 2004, 773.)
So the condition of representational force does not explicitly state what is meant by
an agent, nor how the relevant scientific community should be organized so as to
decide when the representational force of a source is operative. I take this to mean
that there is always an issue of the suﬃcient level of competence and information
required in a given field for determining the representational force of a model source.
Thus, on this account, disagreements concerning the determination of what a model
represents cannot be resolved simply by way of looking at any particular properties
of the model, or at ways in which the model has been constructed and used, but
will have to take into account what representation is taken to mean in the relevant
scientific context. In this sense, representational force does not provide a factual
condition to distinguish cases of representation in science.
With respect to surrogative reasoning, this condition requires that the source of
representation has an internal structure which allows its users to draw inferences
regarding a target, which would not have been possible using just any arbitrarily
chosen sign. Suárez (2004, 773) emphasises that this condition does not specify
what exactly the source’s internal structure has to be like—e.g. whether it has
to be similar or isomorphic to the structure of the target—for the inferences to be
possible. Moreover, the type of inferences required is left open, so that representation
can involve ’any type of reasoning—inductive, analogical, abductive’, in addition to
deductive inferences (Suárez 2004, 773).
Neither does the requirement of surrogative reasoning specify what it means
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that a source allows for surrogative inferences, and this I take to be crucial for the
non-factual character of this condition. As we saw in the previous section, scientific
representation grounds inferences in the sense that there is a set of rules in place
which specifies how the internal structure of the source can be manipulated in order
to draw inferences regarding a target. Suárez (2015, 45-46) argues that ’such rules are
complex features of the practice [of science] that involve carrying out demonstrations
or modifications of the source in order to guide our beliefs regarding the behaviour
of the target.’ I take the point here to be that a multiplicity of diﬀerent sets of rules
are possible with respect to any given source, and the establishment of a particular
set of rules for reasoning with specific kinds of models is a normative matter within
the relevant scientific community.
Therefore, whether the internal structure of a source licences certain inferences
cannot be resolved merely by looking at the properties of the source, but demands
an examination of the norms which govern reasoning using those kinds of sources.
Basing on Hughes’ (1997) DDI theory of representation, Suárez (2015, 46) maintains
that two kinds of rules must be in place in surrogative reasoning. First, there must
be rules for validly inferring consequences within the model. Second, another set of
rules must specify how those consequences are to be interpreted in terms of the tar-
get. However, as Suárez (2015, 44-45; 2004, 770) emphasises, it is not required for
representation that a source is actually reasoned with according to these rules, but
just that there exist rules within the relevant scientific community of the potential
user of a source which could be applied in case the source was to be used in surro-
gative reasoning. Whether any such rules exist and which of them could be applied
in any given case, then, is an issue that depends on what the members of the rele-
vant scientific community think. So the inferential conception alone does not explain
what surrogative reasoning is, but rather points to the necessity of examining norms
of scientific practice in doing so.
In my view, then, the inferential conception can be interpreted as a deflationist
theory of representation at least in one sense, namely that corresponding to [inf*].
Whether this conception is a good theory of scientific representation, or whether it
makes surrogative reasoning an ’activity as mysterious and unfathomable as sooth-
saying’ , as Contessa (2007, 61) argues it does, are questions which we cannot answer
without reflecting on how the inferential conception deals with the problems of repre-
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sentation. This consideration will be taken up in the next chapter.
5.2 Weisberg’s formal account of similarity
Michael Weisberg (2013, Ch. 8; 2012) develops a formal theory of similarity, weighted
feature matching, based on Amos Tversky’s earlier contrast account of similarity.
Weisberg’s explicit aim is to construct an account which can avoid the criticisms
aimed at earlier accounts of similarity, while shedding light on both the semantic
and epistemological aspects of model representation.
Given that Suárez (2015, 37) takes Weisberg’s account to be one of the clearest
examples of recent substantivist theories of representation, and given that Weisberg
sets ambitious aims for the analysis of similarity in his eﬀort to develop a general
account of modelling, weighted feature matching provides a good point of comparison
for Suárez’s inferential conception.
I will first present Weisberg’s account in the next section, and then discuss its
status as a substantivist account in the section to follow. In Chapter 6, we will
then examine the way in which the inferential conception and the weighted feature
matching accounts deal with the problems of representation.
5.2.1 Weighted feature matching
Similarity has often been criticised for being a notion too obscure to provide an
illuminating analysis of representation. Goodman (1972), for instance, argued that
similarity is a mere label for something we do not really understand, and that no
adequate analysis of similarity is forthcoming.
Pace Goodman, Weisberg (2013, 142-143) disagrees with the latter of these
claims, and argues that philosophers such as Giere (1988) and Cartwright (1983)
are right in holding that similarity is the notion in terms of which model-world rela-
tionships should be analysed. The challenge here is then to provide a formal analysis
of similarity which is able to explicate the notion in exact terms. This is precisely
what the weighted feature matching account is designed to do.
In introducing his account, Weisberg (2013, 135-142) sets oﬀ from the recogni-
tion that the various model-theoretic accounts of representation originating from
the semantic tradition are misguided. However, arguing explicitly against Suárez’s
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inferential conception, Weisberg (2013, 141-142) maintains that it is a mistake to
conclude on this basis that issues of representation should be recast in terms of the
inferential activities of scientists. A properly constructed account of similarity, accor-
ding to Weisberg (2013, 142), can meet the requirements for an adequate theory of
representation more than satisfactorily.
Doing so involves satisfying a set of desiderata that model-theoretic accounts
based on isomorphism have failed to satisfy. Some of these desiderata correspond
to Suárez’s criteria for theories of representation that were discussed in Section
3.3.1. For instance, Weisberg (2013, 136) argues that a theory of the model-world
relationship should be able to accommodate the diversity of diﬀerent ways in which
models can represent, and in particular, it should allow that models can represent
by being qualitatively similar to their targets, rather than restricting representation
for quantitative similarities. Furthermore, a good account of representation allows
models to misrepresent their targets by way of idealization, and recognise that model
representation is dependent on the context in which the models are used (Weisberg
2013, 136-137). Therefore, on this view, model representation is not a matter of mere
similarity, but rather similarity in certain relevant respects and degrees, determined
by pragmatic considerations.45
However, in addition to these desiderata, Weisberg requires that model-world
relationships are always grounded on some shared properties between the model
and the target, that is, on similarity. Thus, on a theory trying to account for these
relationships, any model should be recognized to be maximally similar to itself, and
less so in relation to a target which does not share all its properties (Weisberg 2013,
135). Furthermore, the goodness of models should be evaluable in terms of the degree
of similarity obtaining between the model and its target. According to Weisberg
(2013, 136), ’good models will tell us many true things about their targets, and bad
models will not.’ So according to these desiderata, a theory of representation should
be directly relevant for addressing epistemic problems concerning modelling.46
45Here, Weisberg is following the views of Giere (1988).
46Wendy Parker (2015, 270-271) has argued that Weisberg’s account conflates issues concerning
the semantics of representation and the epistemology of modelling with the aim of providing an
account of what underlies scientists’ judgments of the extent to which models are similar to their
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Thus, in developing his account of similarity, Weisberg’s aim is to provide an
exact explication of the notion, which will help us understand the role played by
scientists’ intentions in modelling, as well as shed light on how models are about the
world and how modelling can ground scientific knowledge claims.
So on the weighted feature matching account of similarity, a model
...is similar to its target, or to a mathematical representation of its target, when it shares
certain highly valued features, doesn’t have many highly valued features missing, and when
the target doesn’t have many significant features that the model lacks. (Weisberg 2013,
144-145.)
The features that the model and the target share can be either qualitative or quan-
titative, and can include just about any kind of properties.47 Which properties are
significant and how highly they are valued, on the other hand, are pragmatic matters
that depend on the judgements of modellers.
Weisberg (2013, 145-147) divides the features of models and targets into two
categories, which he calls attributes and mechanisms. The former category includes
the properties and patterns exhibited by those systems, while the latter includes
the processes in the systems which give rise to those properties and patterns. For
instance, the state in which the Schelling segregation model is at each turn of a
simulation run is an attribute, while the rules by which the agents move in the model
are mechanisms. Likewise, the actual state of segregation at any point of time in a
real city is an attribute of that city, whereas the way in which people decide where
to live in that city is a mechanism aﬀecting segregation. The similarity S of a model
to a target may now be formalized as the ratio of attributes and mechanism shared
to the attributes and mechanism not shared between the model and the target.
Let   stand for the set of all features of a model M and a target T .48 The attri-
targets. In his reply to Parker’s criticism, Weisberg (2015, 300-301) claims that his account does
not conflate these issues but rather is intended to address all three issues separately. We will return
to this point later when discussing again the problems of representation in the next chapter.
47Examples of features given by Weisberg (2013, 144) include elements such as ’is red’, ’is to the
left of X’, and ’will land on heads with probability 0.5’.
48To be sure, the model and the target can both have a countless number of diﬀerent features.
According to Weisberg (2013, 148-150), which of these are included in   depends on what he calls
the modeler’s construal of the model. I will examine the notion of construal in more detail in the
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butes and mechanisms of the model and the target may now be written respectively
as the subsets Ma, Mm, Ta, Tm of the feature set  . The similarity S between M
and T is then given by the following weighted feature matching equation (Weisberg
2013, 148):
S(M,T ) =
✓f(Ma \ Ta) + ⇢f(Mm \ Tm)
✓f(Ma \ Ta) + ⇢f(Mm \ Tm) + ↵f(Ma   Ta) +  f(Mm   Tm) +  f(Ta  Ma) +  f(Tm  Mm)
Here, the numerator of the fraction consists of two terms, which are the intersections
of the attributes and mechanisms ofM and T . The denominator, on the other hand,
is populated by the same intersection terms as the numerator, and in addition four
terms which stand for the attributes and mechanisms that the model has but are
lacking in the target, and attributes and mechanisms that the target has but are
lacking in the model. The function f is a weighting function that assigns non-negative
weights to the features ofM and T , depending on their significance as judged on the
part of modellers. ✓, ⇢, ↵,  ,  , and  , on the other hand, are term weights which
determine the importance of each individual term in the represented modelling eﬀort.
(Weisberg 2013, 146-148.)
The idea of the above equation is that it yields a similarity score, bounded
between 0 and 1, for any model-target pair (Weisberg 2013, 147-148). The more
features a model and a target share and the less features they have that are not
shared, the closer to 1 the equation will evaluate. A model that is maximally similar
to its target will thus have a similarity score of 1. Conversely, if no features are
shared between the model and the target, their similarity will evaluate to 0.
The weighting function f serves as a tool to analyse the scientists’ judgements
concerning their models. The thought here is that a modeller may regard as more
important that some particular feature is shared rather than another between the
model and the target. The more important feature is then assigned a larger weight
in comparison to the less important one. Consequently, as diﬀerent modellers might
judge diﬀerent features as more important, the respective similarity scores that they
next section.
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give to the same model might also diverge (Weisberg 2013, 152-154).
Furthermore, the diﬀerent term weights allow the equation to be applied to
diﬀerent kinds of modelling goals (Weisberg 2013, 150-152). For instance, if a model
is used for predictive purposes only, it typically is not very important whether the
model and the target share the same mechanism features, and consequently the term
weights aﬀecting comparisons between mechanism features can be given low values.49
However, in explanatory modelling the mechanism features might be regarded as
crucial, while high accuracy in attribute features is downplayed. For instance, the
checkerboard model can be claimed to provide understanding of segregation at an
abstract level—despite lacking many attributes found in any real city—because it
correctly captures a potential segregation mechanism.
Given a specification of the above aspects regarding a case of modelling, the
weighted feature matching equation can be used to analyse the way in which mo-
dellers judge their models as adequate, compare models to other models, and resol-
ve disagreements concerning model evaluations. According to this account, model
representation centrally involves the judgements of modellers, but is always based
on features actually shared by models and modelled targets, that is, on their si-
milarity. Let us now examine more carefully the substantivism of this account of
representation.
5.2.2 The substantivism of Weisberg’s account
As we saw above, Suárez (2015, 37) certainly considers Weisberg’s account to be an
exemplary recent substantivist theory. However, at the same time, weighted feature
matching is explicit in giving a central place to pragmatic factors in its analysis of
the model-world relationship. In Section 4.2 I argued that we should not restrict the
scope of substantivism to merely dyadic theories of representation, and proposed
the amended version of substantivism encapsulated in [sub*] (see Sect. 4.2, p. 39
above). But how exactly does this scheme fit to Weisberg’s account? Furthermore,
how does the account compare to our deflationary interpretation of the inferential
conception above?
49Or zero value, eliminating the term from the equation.
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The formulation of substantivism according to [sub*] requires that represen-
tation is analysed in terms of necessary and suﬃcient conditions which are non-
representational and factual. I propose that we can cast weighted feature matching
as a substantive account corresponding to this requirement as follows:
[wfm] Model A represents target B if and only if A (i) shares some features with
B (ii) that some user of A regards as significant.
At face value, this interpretation accords with how Weisberg characterises the
model-world relationship. This, at least, is what I take him to mean when he claims
that ’models are similar to their targets when they share many, and do not fail to
share too many, features that are thought to be salient by the scientific community’
(Weisberg 2013, 155). So taken together, Weisberg seems to think that conditions (i)
and (ii) are suﬃcient for representation. Moreover, Weisberg explicitly acknowledges
that both similarity in the sense of shared properties and pragmatic factors are
necessary conditions of the model-world relationship:
As with all similarity-based accounts of model-world relations, I accept from the outset that
there are many relations which can hold between models and the world and that exactly
which relation is intended to hold is a matter of context and theoretical interest. In other
words, model-world similarity is always a similarity in certain relevant respects and degrees.
(Weisberg 2013, 135, italics added.)
Deflationism would have it that if an account of representation is interpreted as
giving necessary and suﬃcient conditions for representation, then those conditions
cannot be factual. So to be substantive, the conditions laid out by [wfm] will have
to qualify as factual conditions for representation.50 On the other hand, to qualify
as factual conditions, (i) and (ii) will have to be such that their obtaining for some
model-target pair does not depend on whether the user of the model thinks that
50It seems to me that the conditions are non-representational, at least insofar as both simi-
larity and significance are not equivalent with representation. Numerous arguments have been
presented to the eﬀect that the former equivalence does not hold (Suárez 2003; Goodman 1976;
1972). Furthermore, representation seems not to be the same thing as being regarded as signi-
ficant by some user, as modellers may regard some features of models to be significant for some
non-representational purposes as well. For instance, certain form might be given to the model for
aesthetic purposes.
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they obtain. Can the conditions be understood according to these requirements?
Let us consider each of them in turn.
In the case of (i), given some specified feature that a model and a target can have,
whether they both have that feature is a matter not dependent on what the user of
the model thinks. Of course, this rests on the assumption that the feature in question
is well-defined enough so that the issue can be resolved by comparing the model and
the target. Given that this is the case, however, the idea that two objects share
some property, such as colour, size, or a mathematical property such as functional
form, is an intuitively understood notion. It then seems that whether condition (i)
obtains for a model-target pair is not dependent on whether the modellers think
that it obtains.
Condition, however, (ii) is more problematic. How is the judgment of a user, or
the contention of the scientific community, not dependent on what the user or the
community thinks? In a sense, it of course is. To see how this condition could still be
factual, we will have to examine more closely Weisberg’s conception of modelling.
Weisberg (2013, 24) argues that models consist of two parts: a structure and a
scientist’s interpretation of that structure. Models are structures in the sense that
they have discernible parts and states, relations between their parts, and transitions
between their states (Weisberg 2013, 15). Alone, the structures of models do not
suﬃce to make them models of anything, in the sense that they would represent
some target distinct from them. Rather, it is the interpretations of modellers which
’tell us what the model is about and set up the relations of denotation between
models and their intended targets’ (Weisberg 2013, 15).
Weisberg (2013, 39) calls these interpretations the construals of models, which on
their part consist of four distinct parts: assignment, scope, and two kinds of fidelity
criteria. Of these, the fidelity criteria have to do with determining the goodness
of model representation, and so they are primarily relevant for determining the
weighting function and term parameters of the weighted feature matching equation.
A modeller who has high fidelity criteria for her model demands that the degree to
which a model should be similar to a given target is high (Weisberg 2013, 41). As
such, the fidelity criteria are criteria for successful or correct representation, rather
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than representation per se, and thus do not directly enter into [wfm].51
The assignment and scope, on the other hand, ’determine and help us to evalua-
te the relationship between parts of the model and parts of real-world phenomena’
(Weisberg 2013, 39). The modeller’s assignment is a notion similar to that of in-
terpretation in Contessa’s account of representation, that is, a mapping of parts of
a represented target system onto parts of the model (Weisberg 2013, 39). The sco-
pe is a specification of which parts in the assignment mapping are intended to be
evaluated in considering the similarity between the model and the target. Weisberg
describes the scope of a model as follows
Modelers thus make decisions about which aspects of their models are to be taken seriously.
Their intended scope specifies which aspects of potential target phenomena are intended to
be represented by the model. (Weisberg 2013, 40.)
Moreover, later he explicitly states that ’ultimately the choice of scope is equivalent
to the choice of   [the feature set]’ (Weisberg 2013, 149). So the features which are
significant in determining whether a model represents a target are those features that
are given in the modeller’s specified assignment and scope. According to this view,
in model representation, there always exists a mapping between certain features of
the model and the target in terms of which they are to be compared with each other.
If a model shares with the target some of the features included in the mapping, then
it represents the target according to [wfm].
The relevant thing to focus on here is that, according to Weisberg, the model-
lers do not have to explicitly articulate the grounds for their construals for these
mappings to be in place:
In many cases, scientists’ judgments about similarity can be made without making feature
sets and weighting functions explicit. However, they can be made precise and explicit when
needed. (Weisberg 2013, 155)
Thus, whenever a model represents a target, there is some mapping in terms of the
features of the model and the target which specifies the relevant respects and degrees
51We will return to discuss the issue of successful representation in the next chapter, when
examining how the inferential conception and weighted feature matching can answer epistemic
problems concerning modelling.
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of similarity between them. This holds even when the modellers have not precisely
articulated the construal specifying this mapping, so its obtaining is in this sense
independent of their view about the situation. Whether the model represents is not
on this view dependent on whether the scientists think that the model represents,
but on whether there is a construal which can be articulated and whether some of
the similarities specified in that construal in fact do obtain. Thus, the requirement
(ii) above can be regarded as a factual condition of representation, and consequently
it would seem that [wfm] can be taken to be a substantive theory of representation
in accordance with [sub*].
It is instructive to compare this interpretation of the weighted feature matching
account with the deflationism of the inferential conception discussed above. Accor-
ding to the former view, model representation requires—given a conception of the
model and its target adopted by scientists—that the model shares specified proper-
ties with the target, in some intuitively understood sense. The conception of the
model and the target is analysed as a mapping between some parts of the target on-
to some parts of the model, which can be made explicit and precise when required.
One strength of the weighted feature matching, that Weisberg (2013, 155) emphasi-
ses, is that the account alleviates the articulation of the scientists’ model construals
by providing formal concepts in terms of which they can be discussed.
By contrast, according to the inferential conception—given a conception of the
model and the target adopted by scientists—model representation does not require
that the model is similar to its target. Rather, the only thing required is that the
model allows for inferences regarding the target which would not have been possible
using just any arbitrarily chosen sign. However, what it means that a model allows
for inferences, and which inferences it does allow, are issues dependent on the repre-
sentational norms of the scientific community, as well as on the conception of the
model and the target. One of the main points of Suárez’s deflationism is that theo-
ries of representation should focus on studying the former. Concerning the latter,
the inferential conception remains silent, stating just that the model should lead its
used to a consideration of the target. Compared to Weisberg’s substantivist view,
then, the inferential conception is deflationary in that it does not specify a clearly
defined criteria which tells us what representation means across all scientific con-
texts. Rather, this conception just indicates where to look for in each context, were
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one to be interested in the meaning of representation in that context.
Is the above formulation of weighted feature matching tenable? Referring back
to the discussion in Section 4.2, can we plausibly conclude that pragmatic factors
are factual conditions of representation? Before moving on to examine again the
problems of representation, there is a diﬃculty with the substantivism of [wfm]
which we should first take into account.52
The problem here is that if we consider model construals to be factual and in-
dependent of what the modellers think, then it would seem that the judgments of
modellers become irrelevant for representation. Suppose that a model M represents
a target T . According to [wfm], in this case there is a mapping of some parts of
M onto parts of T which determines the relevant similarity relations between M
and T . Moreover, this mapping does not necessarily have to be articulated when
a modeller takes M to represent T . In fact, the modeller can even think that the
particular mapping constituting the representation of T by M is not responsible for
representation to obtain. Nevertheless, it is the unarticulated mapping which cons-
titutes representation here, along with the similarities between M and T included
in that mapping.
Now, our formulation of substantivism was amended to permit the inclusion of
pragmatic factors partly because Weisberg claims that one of the main aims of his
account is to understand the role that the modellers’ intentions play in science (Weis-
berg 2013, 20). That is, Weisberg’s theory simultaneously aims to be a substantivist
and triadic account of representation. Above I have argued that to do so, the theory
would have to provide a definition of representation in terms of factual conditions
while at the same time retaining a role for pragmatics in representation.
The diﬃculty with our interpretation of [wfm] in accordance with [sub*] is that
if the judgments of scientists play no role in determining what a model construal
represents, then the account is in danger of becoming dyadic again. If construals are
independent of the intentions of modellers and they alone with similarity relations
are suﬃcient for representation, then models would seem to represent their targets
irrespective of whether anyone takes them to represent those targets. But if this is
52I thank Professor Aki Lehtinen for pointing out this diﬃculty for me.
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the case, then why require that the features specified in the construal are ’thought
to be salient by the scientific community’ (Weisberg 2013, 155)? If it makes no
diﬀerence what the modellers think about the construal, why should judgments of
significance enter into [wfm] in the first place?
On the other hand, were the judgments allowed to play a role, then the features
considered significant for representation should always correspond to those features
that the modellers really think are significant. In this case, [wfm] could not be
straightforwardly interpreted to be a substantivist theory in accordance with [sub*].
Still, it would not be a deflationist theory in that it requires that representation is
always constituted by similarity. However, in order to determine which interpretation
of [wfm] is appropriate, the way in which model construals are formulated should
be further clarified.
In what follows, I will assume that [wfm] can be interpreted according to [sub*].
This way, the contrast between deflationary dissolutions and substantivist solutions
to the problems of representation is clearer. According to this interpretation, the
judgements of modellers do play a part in the representational relation in the form
of adopted model construals. Specifying how the judgments can be involved in repre-
sentation even though construals are independent of what the modellers think is a
problem which Weisberg does not answer clearly enough.
6 The problems of representation revisited
We are finally in the position to ask: how do the inferential conception and weighted
feature matching deal with the problems of representation discussed above, and
what is their comparative import as conceptions which could be used to shed light
on problems concerning scientific modelling?
Below, I will argue that while the deflationism of the inferential conception en-
sures that the account can be applied to as many diﬀerent cases of representation as
possible, the account simultaneously ends up characterising representation with an
obscure reference to normative practice. Explicating how representation could be un-
derstood to be a normative feature of practice is then a challenge for the inferential
conception, as well as Suárezian deflationism in general.
By contrast, while the weighted feature matching account can give a precise
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analysis of model representation, it necessitates that surrogative inferences with
models are always grounded in similarity relations between models and their targets.
This assumption is something that Weisberg does not argue for, and thus the issue
remains open whether weighted feature matching can satisfy Suárez’s criteria of
adequacy. In addition, I will discuss criticism presented by Wendy Parker (2015) to
the eﬀect that weighted feature matching fails to achieve the aims it sets for itself.
In particular, the account seems not to be able to address the problem of soundness,
although this is one of its explicit goals.
6.1 Deflationary dissolutions
Above I have argued that the inferential conception is a deflationary theory of repre-
sentation in that the conditions it gives for representation do not specify factual
terms with which to explain how surrogative reasoning with models is grounded.
Understood according to [inf*], the inferential conception merely claims that it is
necessary and suﬃcient for representation that some competent and informed agent
is able to draw inferences using a source which would not have been possible using
just any arbitrary source. These conditions alone do not tell us what it means that
a source allows some user to draw specific inferences regarding a target, but rather
indicate that the wider scientific context will have to be examined to find out how
surrogative inferences are grounded in each particular case.
I take this to be the crux of the inferential conception’s deflationary dissolution
of the problems of representation: the account resists a fact-based analysis of repre-
sentation, and maintains that the meaning of the concept at a general level amounts
to nothing more than the apparent surface features of representational force and
surrogative reasoning which regularly accompany its occurrence in scientific con-
texts. Let us now see how the inferential conception handles the diﬀerent problems
of representation introduced in Section 3.3.
6.1.1 Satisfying the criteria of adequacy
Suárez (2004, 767-769) explicitly designed the inferential conception to meet the
requirements for theories of representation which emerge from his criticisms of the
isomorphism and similarity based views. To recap, these requirements demand that
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the concept should be applicable to all clear cases of representation in science, that
the logical properties of representation are respected, that misrepresentation is al-
lowed for, and that certain non-necessary or non-suﬃcient conditions are not claimed
to be necessary or suﬃcient for representation.
Suárez (2004, 775-776) argues that his account can easily meet these require-
ments. Indeed, as [inf*] sets no requirements on what the relationship between a
model and its target will have to be for representation to occur, it is maximally
inclusive with respect to diﬀerent means of representation. The reasoning about a
target using a source can be grounded on whatever relations or properties of those
objects, such as similarity or some morphism. Thus, the way in which [inf*] could
fail the to meet the first requirement is that if a clear case of model representation
were found in which the source would not allow a competent and informed user to
draw specific inferences regarding the target. Lacking such example, it seems to me
that the inferential conception meets the first requirement.
Furthermore, the condition of representational force seems to accord with the
logical properties of representation, since a user who is led to consider a target
by a source need not in turn be led to a consideration of that same source by the
target (nonsymmetry), or of the source itself (nonreflexivity). Moreover, if the target
of some representation comes to be used as a source in representing some further
target, this need not mean that the first source also represents this further target
(nontransitivity).
The condition of representational force also accounts for the phenomenon of mis-
targeting because a source can lead an incompetent or misinformed user to consider
a target that competent and informed users would not take the source to represent
(Suárez 2004, 775-776). Moreover, in addition to guaranteeing the cognitive value of
scientific representation, including the condition of surrogative reasoning allows for
[inf*] to account for cases of misrepresentation in the sense of inaccuracy (Suárez
2004, 776). For a source which allows a user to draw inferences regarding a target
need not yield inferences to true conclusions regarding the target.
Finally, the necessary conditions posited by [inf*] seem to be reasonable with
respect to scientific representation. After all, it does seem to be necessary for repre-
sentation in general that suﬃciently competent and informed users are led to a
consideration of the represented target. Moreover, it is hard to think of instances
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of representation in science where the representational vehicle would not allow for
specific inferences regarding the target.
To see that the inferential conception meets the requirement of not positing
non-suﬃcient conditions as suﬃcient, it should be noted that Suárez’s (2004, 773)
original formulation of the inferential conception does not hold that representational
force and surrogative reasoning are suﬃcient for scientific representation. So in case
these conditions were found not to be suﬃcient for representation, [inf*] could just
be loosened back to its original form, and this last requirement would be satisfied.
6.1.2 Understanding modelling with a deflated concept of representa-
tion
Now, how does the inferential conception deal with the problems pertaining to the
ontology of models, semantics of representation, and epistemology of modelling?
Suárez (2003) clearly states that he thinks that theories of representation, be they
substantive or deflationary, should not strictly speaking be required to alleviate
problems having to do with the epistemology of modelling:
...we shall not require a theory of representation to mark or explain the distinction between
accurate and inaccurate representation, or between a reliable and unreliable one, but merely
between something that is a representation and something that is not. (Suárez 2003, 226.)
Furthermore, I will assume here that ontological questions are of relevance for theo-
ries of representation only insofar as answering them helps one’s theory in distinguis-
hing between representation and non-representation. Thus, for Suárez, theories of
representation are primarily in the business of answering semantic questions concer-
ning the meaning of the concept of representation.
However, Suárez (2003, 223) does think that it is a merit for a theory of repre-
sentation to be conducive to solving epistemic problems having to do with scientific
modelling. Moreover he seems to think that the inferential conception—despite its
deflationary orientation—has this additional import to give to philosophy of model-
ling (Suárez 2004, 776-778). How then, we can ask, is a deflationary theory of repre-
sentation able to address problems having to do with scientific modelling, starting
out from a rejection of the aim to specify what representation in science is?
To begin, let us briefly discuss model ontology. Suárez (2004, 773-774) holds that
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in order to represent, a model source has to have an internal structure which allows
its user to draw certain specific inferences regarding a target. Thus, the conception
seems to rest on the presupposition that models have a structure on which surrogati-
ve reasoning can operate. On the other hand, I think that the inferential conception
need not be committed to a structuralist account of models in any strict sense, as it
explicitly does not place requirements on the kinds of reasoning allowed in model-
ling. The only thing that is required is that the models are such that they can allow
for specific inferences. Thus, [inf*] would seem to be compatible with whatever mo-
del ontology that allows models to have some features or parts on which surrogative
reasoning can operate.53
When it comes to semantic problems, we saw that they come in three varieties,
above referred to as the problems of constitution, style, and demarcation. I have
argued that when modelling is understood as surrogative reasoning, the problem
of constitution can be seen to concern the way in which model-based surrogative
inferences are about a target. Similarly, the problem of style in this sense can be
articulated as follows: what kinds of diﬀerent styles, modes, or means of surrogative
reasoning are there in science, and how do they work? Thirdly, the problem of
demarcation is that of specifying how surrogative reasoning with models is diﬀerent
from representation in other areas of human activity, such as art.
[inf*] is patently deflationist regarding the problem of constitution. The problem
is dissolved by stating that reasoning with models is about a target when the model
leads a competent and informed user to consider the target. However, it is not
specified what kind of competence and information is required, nor what does it
mean that a model ’leads’ the user to consider a target. Rather, the inferential
conception maintains that an analysis of representation cannot provide answers to
these questions: they are entirely dependent on the scientific context in question.
With respect to the problem of style, [inf*] does not have much more to say. The
53In particular, the inferential conception need not be committed to the model-theoretic view
according to which models are abstract extensional structures. Suárez’s account seems to be com-
patible with models being material objects or as abstract structures, as long as they have some
parts or features which can be used in surrogative reasoning. For discussion of the model-theoretic
account, see Suárez (1999) and Frigg (2006).
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only requirement set for diﬀerent means of representation is that the model source
should have an internal structure which allows for inferences that are specifically
enabled by that structure. Which styles of representation allow for what kinds of
inferences is not further analysed, but again the specification of these is seen to be
dependent on the norms of reasoning employed by the used. These, on the other
hand, are due to the scientific community of which the user is a part.
What about the problem of demarcation? Suárez does put the inferential concep-
tion forward as an account of scientific representation in particular. The requirement
of the specificity of surrogative inferences in this conception can moreover be seen
as a demarcating criterion between scientific and other kinds of representation. As
Suárez (2004, 771) puts it, scientific representation diverges from representation in
general in that it ’adds a characteristic from of objectivity to the phenomenological
features of original representation’.
However, I would resist the conclusion that [inf*] should be regarded as a formu-
lation of a demarcation criterion between scientific and non-scientific representation.
The reason is that, in my view, other kinds of representations apart from scientific
cases can allow for specific inferences regarding their targets (see Contessa 2007, 53-
54). Consider, for instance, an ordinary photograph of a building. The photograph
allows for many kinds of inferences about the building’s architectural features, size,
and surroundings, for example. Furthermore, these inferences would not have been
possible given just any arbitrary sign of the building, such as the building’s name.
However, it is not plausible to claim solely on this basis that just any photograph is
a scientific representation of the depicted target.
Therefore, it seems that the inferential conception is best regarded to be an
account of cognitive representation, rather than of scientific representation. Cogniti-
vely valuable representations indeed seem to be the dominant form of representation
in science, but they are not peculiar to science. Whether there is a criterion which
could be used to demarcate some instances of cognitive representations as scientific
and some as non-scientific, the inferential conception does not say.54
54Suárez (2004, 777) argues that in his view, one advantage of the inferential conception is
that it captures ’the representational or nonrepresentational distinction in art as well as science.’
Thus, he seems to agree that the account is not intended to be an analysis specifically of scientific
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What about the problems pertaining to the epistemology of modelling? Above
we saw that these can be further distinguished into problems concerning the validity
and soundness of surrogative reasoning. The problem of validity is that of specifying
what grounds the rules according to which surrogative inferences with a model can
be valid. The problem of soundness, on the other hand, asks for an explanation of
what makes the conclusions of model-based inferences true.
Regarding validity, the inferential conception sees the rules of model-based in-
ferences to be given again by the representational practice of science. According to
Suárez, the inferential power of a source towards some target is constituted
...by the rules that provide the source with the capacity to generate the inferences. Such
rules are complex features of the practice that involve carrying out demonstrations or mo-
difications of the source in order to guide our beliefs regarding the behaviour of the target.
(Suárez 2015, 45-46.)
On this view, although the model is required to have the internal structure (or
features) on which reasoning with it can operate, the rules that make such reasoning
valid are ’features of the practice’. Thus, the practice determines how the model
should be reasoned with, and which features of the model the inferences should
be operate on. For this reason, our conception of representation cannot give us a
clearly defined answer concerning the contents of those rules: as the scientific context
changes, so too do the rules governing surrogative inferences.
Finally, Suárez (2004, 776) argues that the inferential conception can explain the
notions of truth, empirical adequacy, and completeness in scientific representations.
The idea here is that according to the inferential conception, a source represents
when it ’licences’ inferences regarding a target. I have taken this to mean that the
inferences must be valid according to some rules concerning the source. Now, accor-
ding to Suárez, a representation is
...true if it licences no inferences to false conclusions about the target; it is complete if it
is true and fully informative, licensing inferences to all truths about the target; and it is
empirically adequate if it is complete with respect to all the observable or measurable aspects
of the target, licensing inferences to all the truths about those aspects. (Suárez 2004, 776)
There are two points to note about this characterisation. First, as it is based
representation.
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on the notion of licencing inferences which is understood to be a context-dependent
feature of scientific practice, then by extension, so too is this analysis of truth,
completeness, and empirical adequacy context-dependent. Second, this analysis in
itself does not yet tell us anything about the conditions for drawing model-based
inferences to true conclusions about the world. In particular, the inferential concep-
tion does not seem to shed light on the role played by the autonomous status of
models and unrealistic modelling assumptions in drawing surrogative inferences to
true conclusions.
Most probably, this is how Suárez would have it, provided that in his view, mo-
delling epistemology is not strictly speaking an issue for theories of representation.
However, the inferential conception does provide a framework for discussing episte-
mic questions as problems pertaining to the drawing of inferences with models, and
in this sense it helps focus philosophy of modelling on a certain kind of scientific
activity.
The inferential conception then aims to answer the problems of representation
distinguished by Frigg (2006) by way of dissolution rather than solution. On this
account, these problems are in fact not problems of representation in the sense
that a solution to them cannot be arrived at by theorizing about the concept of
representation. Now, the question can be asked: does this leave us helpless in the
attempt to understand how surrogative reasoning with models works? Does the
deflationary interpretation of the inferential conception make surrogative reasoning
an unnecessarily mysterious activity?
My answer here is yes and no. On the one hand, the formulation of Suárez’s de-
flationism we have adopted above still gives us clues as to what look for in diﬀerent
scientific contexts to understand modelling. The semantic problems of representa-
tion, according to this view, are not problems to be solved by analysing the concept
of representation. Rather, they are problems which can be solved by examining the
norms which govern modelling in diﬀerent areas of science. The point of deflating
representation is not to claim that the means by which representation works could
not in the end be discerned. In particular, Suárezian deflationism does not preclude
the possibility that in some cases, similarity or isomorphism can be the means of
representation. However, the point is that our understanding of modelling is in dan-
ger of becoming limited if all cases are approached with the same pre-defined notion
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of the model-world relationship.
However, the deflationism of the inferential conception maintains that if surro-
gative reasoning with models can be explained with the help of representation (i.e.
specified how the inferences are about a target, or how the inferences can be va-
lid), then that is because our analysis of representation will have incorporated a
detailed examination of the normative context in which the reasoning takes place.
Here is the part which still has an air of mystery around it. What exactly are the
norms of representation which Suárez pledges us to study in order to make sense
of surrogative reasoning with models? How are the relevant scientific norms selec-
ted among those that are relevant given a specific case at hand? In fact, are there
norms in science which are specifically ’representational’? Suárez leaves the notion
of normative practice vague when it comes to representation in science.
6.2 Solving the problems of representation
Finally, let us see how the substantive account of Weisberg can answer the problems
of representation. I will argue that in fact, weighted feature matching does not
provide us with answers to these questions which would allow for any more definite
solutions to modelling problems than the answers given by the inferential conception
do.
6.2.1 Is weighted feature matching an adequate theory of representa-
tion?
First, let us see whether weighted feature matching satisfies Suárez’s criteria. [wfm]
states that a model represents a target if an only if the model shares some features
with the target which are specified in the modeller’s construal.
Regarding, Suárez’s first criterion, Weisberg (2013, 136) too argues that an
account of the model-world relation must be able to accommodate the diversity
of diﬀerent kinds of features that can be shared between the model and the target.
This is taken into account in weighted feature matching by allowing that the features
in terms of which models and targets are compared can be ’quantitative, qualita-
tive’, or ’just about anything else’ (Weisberg 2013). However, the account seems to
presuppose that in every case of representation, the model and the target must sha-
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re some features. This is what it means for them to be similar, and similarity in this
sense is what constitutes the ’representational capacity of structures’, according to
Weisberg (2013, 42-43) .
On the other hand, one of Suárez’s (2003, 235-236) arguments for adopting del-
fationism was precisely that similarity in the sense of shared properties is not a
necessary condition of representation. Whether this is really the case can be dis-
puted, but let us assume for the sake of argument that similarity, even in specified
respects and degrees, is not necessary for representation. Can [wfm] accommodate
such cases?
It seems that the answer here is ’yes’. Weisberg (2013, 42) maintains that since
the model construal plays such a large role in weighted feature matching, strict-
ly speaking just about anything can be a representation of anything else. All that
is required for this is that there is a model construal to be articulated in terms
of the target. However, while model representation seems to depend only on con-
struals, Weisberg (2013, 43) argues that representation without shared features is
representation only in some trivial sense, in that it ’is very diﬃcult to represent one
system with a model very much unlike it.’ Thus, it seems plausible to assume that
[wfm] at least necessitates that cognitively valuable representations are similar to
their targets. Therefore, if Suárez is right in holding that similarity is not necessary
for (cognitive) representation, then [wfm] has diﬃculties accommodating cases of
representation where surrogative reasoning does not operate on similarity.
Concerning the second criterion, [wfm] seems to attribute the correct logical
properties to representation, because it includes the requirement of construal in its
definition of representation. For the same reason, the account is able to accommodate
misrepresentation in its two forms. First, according to weighted feature matching,
a model can represent its target while depicting it in an inaccurate fashion. This
happens when there is a construal of the model in terms of some target, but in reality
the model and the target share only few of the features specified in the construal.
Second, the account allows for the case in which a model is judged not to be similar
enough to a target specified in the construal, but rather better represents some other
target. Here, it can be said that the model was mistargeted to be a representation
of the first target system.
Finally, it seems to me that the conditions posited by [wfm] really are suﬃcient
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for representation, as they make stronger claims concerning the concept than the
inferential conception. Indeed, it is hard to think of a case of modelling in which a
model is construed as a representation of a target and is similar to it, but would
nevertheless fail to represent it.
6.2.2 What does weighted feature matching help us understand?
Wendy Parker (2015) has argued that the weighted feature matching account con-
flates some of the distinct problems of representation that were discussed above:
Here are three aims someone interested in scientific modeling might have: to provide an
account of similarity as the model-world relation in virtue of which successful scientific
models are successful; to provide an account of similarity as the sort of relation that generally
holds between models and their targets; to provide an account of what underlies scientists’
judgments of the extent to which models are similar to their targets. These are three diﬀerent
aims, calling for diﬀerent sorts of analyses, but they seem to be conflated in Weisberg’s
discussion. (Parker 2015, 270-271.)
Of these aims, the first is directed towards solving what I have categorized as the
epistemological problems concerning modelling, while the second seeks to give an
answer to the semantic problem of what it means to say that models represent.
The third aim is related to the problem of analysing the role that the intentions of
modellers play in modelling.
This criticism is relevant here in particular because Parker argues further that
weighted feature matching is ’best characterized an account of what underwrites
scientists’ judgments of the extent to which models and targets are similar’ (Par-
ker 2015, 271, italics in the original). If this criticism is on the right track, then
Weisberg’s account would in fact fail to provide solutions to the problems of repre-
sentation. Given that my aim here is to use [wfm] as an example of an account with
substantive solutions to these problems, it is in my interest to construct the stron-
gest possible reading of Weisberg’s views so that its substantivism can be compared
to the deflationism of the inferential conception.
Weisberg (2015, 300-301) replies briefly to Parker’s criticism, arguing that his
account addresses all of the three distinct aims. However, he does not really elaborate
on how the first two aims are addressed. In my view, the articulation of weighted
feature matching in the form of [wfm] helps us see the answer here.
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First, [wfm] provides a solution to the problem of constitution. According to
this view, to claim that surrogative reasoning with a model is about a target is to
say that a modeller has adopted an assignment which maps features of the target
onto features of the model, according to a certain scope which specifies which of
these mappings are important. In addition, it is required that the model and the
target share at least some of the features specified in the scope.
Second, these requirements are formalized in the weighted feature matching equa-
tion, which can be used to represent various diﬀerent styles of modelling in a precise
manner. Doing so turns on the term parameters and the weighting function also
included in the equation. As Parker (2015, 271) claims, these stand for the mo-
dellers’ judgments concerning the relative importance of diﬀerent features of their
models. However, the representation of these judgments in terms of parameters and
the weighting function enables the equation to be used to represent diﬀerent sty-
les of representation and the way in which they relate to each other. For instance,
Weisberg (2013, 151, 118-119) argues that the strategy of how-possibly modelling,
or the construction of models which are aimed at generating the target’s attributes
with a plausible mechanism, can be represented by setting the term weights for the
mechanism terms of the equation to zero and specifying a high value for the terms
involving shared attributes. Thus, weighted feature matching provides a formal tool
for analysing diﬀerent styles of representing with models.
Weisberg does not explicitly comment on the issue of what would demarca-
te scientific representations from other kinds of representation, so discussing the
account in relation to this problem is diﬃcult. However, regarding epistemic ques-
tions pertaining to modelling, I think that [wfm] has quite a lot to say. Whether
what is says helps solve any problems is then a separate issue which will be taken
up soon.
First, Weisberg explicitly states that the aim of diﬀerent types of modelling are
to maximize the model’s similarity score given by the weighted feature matching
equation (Weisberg 2013, 150-152). Thus, models are evaluated as successful by
scientists when they share with their targets features that are deemed important.
But this is where Parker’s criticism starts to take its bite: how do we know that the
features that are deemed important really are important for the achievement of the
modelling aims?
76
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between valid and sound sur-
rogative inferences. While it seems to me that [wfm] has the resources requisite
to provide an analysis of what the former are grounded in modelling, I think that
Parker is right in her criticism when it comes to grounding surrogative inferences
to true conclusions. With respect to the latter, weighted feature matching seems
only to claim that certain similarities between models and targets are thought by
scientists to guarantee that their inferences with the models lead to true conclusions.
As far as it goes, although Weisberg does not state the issue explicitly in these
terms, the construals adopted by modellers can be seen as providing the rules accor-
ding to which surrogative inferences can be valid or invalid. This account is substan-
tive first because it analyses valid surrogative reasoning in terms of an established
denotative mapping adopted by the modeller, and second because it requires that
the inferences operate on similarity relations between the model and the target.
In comparison to the deflationary analysis of the inferential conception, this view
seemingly has the virtue of explicating validity in precise terms. However, as the
modellers’ construal can choose almost any kinds of features as the ones on which to
ground reasoning with the model, it is not clear whether weighted feature matching
gives any less obscure view of what the validity of surrogative inferences amounts
to than the inferential conception does.
Now, if one were to claim that weighted feature matching solves the problem of
how models can allow surrogative inferences to true conclusions about their targets,
then it seems to me that two things would have to be presupposed. The first one
is the assumption pointed at by Parker that the modeller’s construals somehow
come to select the similarities between models and targets that really are important
given some modelling goal. Weisberg has not so far given any justification for this
assumption.
Second, even if it were accepted that the similarities selected by modellers are
always the ones that in fact are important given the goals of surrogative reasoning,
the additional assumption would still have to be made that similarity is somehow
conducive to the truth of the conclusions of the modellers’ inferences. In other words,
it would have to be assumed that it is always a premiss of the modellers’ inferences
that the model is similar in certain respects and degrees to the target. This is preci-
sely what the deflationary approach disputes: according to deflationism, represen-
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tation cannot be reduced to any particular relation between models and targets,
and so the modellers’ reasoning should not always have to be based on premises
concerning model-world similarity.
Let us close this section by considering whether weighted feature matching is
committed to the particular ontological position advocated by Weisberg. As we saw,
Weisberg argues that models are structures, and model representation is structural.
It seems, however, that weighted feature matching does not necessitate that models
are viewed as structures. The only thing that this account requires is that modellers
are able to construe their models in terms of the represented targets, and that the
models and the targets share features. As the view is very permissive regarding the
nature of the features shared, comparisons between the model and the target are
certainly not restricted to be between structural properties. Thus, it would seem
that weighted feature matching could at least be modified to be compatible with
other kinds of model ontologies as well.
To recap, weighted feature matching provides substantive solutions to the seman-
tic problems of constitution and style. In this respect, the account’s substantivism
seems to be beneficial in that it helps articulate a theoretical view of how surroga-
tive reasoning with models can be about the world, as well as develop a taxonomy
of diﬀerent modelling goals and styles of representation helpful in achieving them.
However, the account seems to wind up into trouble when its assumption concerning
the necessity of similarity for representation is pressed. To justify this assumption,
Weisberg would have to provide an argument to the eﬀect that all model-world rela-
tionships should be treated as relations of similarity. Moreover, the account should
specify more clearly how model construals are come about, given that they can be
independent of the modellers’ intentions.
Furthermore, weighted feature matching is able to meet many of Suárez’s criteria
by including the modeller’s construal as a central element in its analysis of represen-
tation. However, this same move seems to raise problems for the account, understood
as aiming to provide an analysis of what grounds the soundness of surrogative in-
ferences. As long as this problem remains, it seems that weighted feature matching
can provide no better solutions to epistemic problems pertaining to modelling than
the inferential conception does.
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7 Deflationary representation as a normative prac-
tice
The point of this final chapter of the thesis is to consider in greater detail Suá-
rez’s claim that deflationary representation is a normative practice of science, in
order to articulate an answer to the question of whether deflationary theories of
representation can have a positive role to play in philosophy of modelling.
Below, I will be arguing that there indeed is one such role: deflationary repre-
sentation can be seen as a tool for reorienting the various problems pertaining to
the philosophical study of modelling, with consequences for the division of epistemic
labour between diﬀerent approaches to these problems. Most importantly, deflatio-
nism implies that not all of these problems can be addressed by way of philosophical
analysis, but instead they can be more fruitfully studied using methods from other
disciplines (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, 3827-3828). However, I will be arguing
that according to Suárezian deflationism, philosophy still has a role to play in that
it serves as a conceptualisation of the norms of scientific practice that are relevant
for the study of modelling.
In order to frame the discussion about the role of deflationism, we should first
examine in greater detail the reasons for thinking that deflationary representation
has no import for philosophy of modelling. These reasons, in my view, can be seen
as being rooted in the thought that deflationism makes representation in science so-
mehow arbitrary or subjective, obliterating the usefulness of theorising about repre-
sentation. In Section 7.1 I will thus distinguish two senses in which deflationary
representation can be claimed to be arbitrary, and argue that Suárezian deflatio-
nism can avoid both of these. Then, on the basis of this discussion, Section 7.2 will
examine what a theory of representation thus understood can be seen to contribute
to the philosophical discussions of modelling.
7.1 The arbitrariness of deflationary representation
Deflationism has been accused of making representation in science a subjective or
arbitrary matter, too devoid of content to give us any real understanding of model-
ling in science. It is for this reason that Contessa claims that deflationism makes
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surrogative reasoning with models ’unnecessarily mysterious’ (Contessa 2011, 126),
and Weisberg (2013, 141-142) opts for an exact substantive definition of similarity
as an analysis of representation. The point here is that since deflationism does not
give us exact criteria which define the concept of representation so as to allow a
uniform analysis of modelling across all contexts, our understanding of modelling is
compromised. As Contessa puts it,
...Suárez’s pessimism about finding deeper features of scientific representation leaves one
with the mistaken impression that there is something mysterious about our ability to use
models to perform pieces of surrogative reasoning about their target systems. (Contessa
2007, 51.)
On the other hand, as we have seen above, Suárez (2004, 772-773) is explicit
in requiring that the representations employed in science are objective in the sense
that they allow inferences about their targets which would not have been possible
using just any arbitrary sign. Thus, while being accused of not aiming to uncover
the ’deeper features’ of representation, Suárezian deflationism seeks to secure a form
of non-arbitrariness characteristic of representation in science.
Does deflationism make representation in science arbitrary, and in what sense?
Below, I will distinguish between two senses of arbitrariness, namely, arbitrariness
as independence from modelling targets and arbitrariness as stipulation, and argue
that Suárezian deflationism can avoid both of them.
7.1.1 Arbitrariness as independence from modelling targets
The first sense in which deflationary representation can be claimed to be arbitrary
is connected to deflationism’s resistance towards specifying factual conditions which
would provide a solution to the problem of grounding scientific knowledge claims in
model-based reasoning.
The worry of arbitrariness in this connection is that if representation is dependent
on the conceptions of modellers, then there is nothing in our analysis of represen-
tation which could guarantee that the representational vehicles employed in science
can provide knowledge about the parts of the world they stand for. Adopting a de-
flationary analysis of representation thus seems to sever the epistemic link between
models and their targets by making the analysis of representation independent of
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the model-world relation that was supposed to explain the epistemic value of models
(Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015, 3828). The first sense in which deflationary represen-
tation can be accused of being arbitrary is thus that deflationism does not specify
the way in which models should be constrained by their targets in order to shed
light on how surrogative reasoning with models is grounded.
As Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015, 3827-3828) have argued, however, this cri-
ticism misunderstands the main message of deflationism. The whole idea of dis-
solving the problems of representation by deflating the concept is based on the
contention that a solution to those problems—including the epistemic problems of
modelling—cannot be provided by philosophically analysing the concept of represen-
tation. This, however, need not mean that the epistemic import of models could not
be explained, but just that it is not the business of philosophical theories of repre-
sentation to do so. Furthermore, once we realise that the epistemic value of models
is not a problem for philosophers to address and solve, the problem itself starts to
look less ominous. Emphasising this insight, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski argue that
It is certainly not arbitrary that a specific diagram, set of equations, or physical scale model
is more helpful in inferring about a specific target phenomenon than some alternatives...It
is no accident that movable tokens on a grid provide a good way for beings equipped with
vision and hands to keep score of the rule-based movements of postulated agents, and it is
no accident that such systems of reasoning can be used to make counterfactual inferences
concerning segregation in cities. It is just the case that there is no substantial and general
philosophical explanation for this representational success. (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski 2015,
3828.)
So the point of deflationism is not to argue that the epistemic problems pertai-
ning to surrogative reasoning with models could not be solved. Rather, the point
is that philosophical theorising should give way to other ways of approaching the-
se problems, instead of insisting that our explanations of modelling success should
always be in terms of some particular factual relation obtaining between models
and their targets. Suárez paves the way for this same point by claiming that, on a
deflationary account, the means of representation are plural and context-dependent
(Suárez 2015, 47; see also Sect. 4.3 above). Deflationism does not deny that factual
conditions would not be relevant for modelling epistemology, but rather holds that
our conception of modelling should not unduly restrict our account to a narrow set
of such conditions.
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How, then, should the epistemic value of models be explained? Kuorikoski and
Ylikoski (2015, 3828) argue that if modelling is understood as an inference-making
activity of a cognitive agent using an instrument, then the explanation of how such
an activity works is a task proper to cognitive science. Thus, in the study of scien-
tific modelling, deflating the concept of representation can be seen as an eﬀort to
negotiate the division of epistemic labour between two disciplines with a common
subject of interest: model-based reasoning in science.
7.1.2 Arbitrariness as stipulation
The second sense of arbitrariness relevant to deflationary representation is the view
according to which representation is not a normative concept at all, but instead just
a matter of stipulative symbolization. Although Suárez explicitly makes normativity
a defining feature of his deflationism, it is instructive to consider here what would
follow in case representation was considered to be solely dependent on stipulation.
I take as my starting point here the idea that a minimal requirement which
any concept should satisfy in order to qualify as normative is that there should be
correct and incorrect ways of using that concept.55 According to this view, to claim
that representation is a normative concept is to claim that there exists a standard
according to which some ways of using the concept are correct, while others are not.
Conversely, to view representation as a stipulative concept is to hold that there is
no such standard in place.
Let me elaborate on this point by briefly presenting an account according to
which representation in science can be reduced to stipulation. Callender and Cohen
(2006) argue that scientific representation is just a special case of Gricean mental
representation. On this account, the only thing required for a model to represent a
target is that someone thinks that it does, or stipulates that the model is a repre-
sentation of the target:
...we propose that the varied representational vehicles used in scientific settings (models,
equations, toothpick constructions, drawings, etc.) represent their targets (the behavior of
ideal gases, quantum state evolutions, bridges) by virtue of the mental states of their ma-
55I thank Professor Jaakko Kuorikoski for making this point clear to me.
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kers/users. For example, the drawing represents the bridge because the maker of the drawing
stipulates that it does, and intends to activate in his audience (consumers of the represen-
tational vehicle, including possibly himself) the belief that it does. (Callender and Cohen
2006, 75.)
On this view, whether representation in science obtains is solely a matter of
whether someone thinks that it obtains. Compared to Suárez’s inferential conception,
this account holds that it is a suﬃcient condition for a source A to represent target B
that the representational force of A leads some user to a consideration of B. On this
view, there is no requirement that the user is competent or informed in any special
way, or that A allows some specific inferences to be made regarding B. As Callender
and Cohen argue, such requirements are ’questions about the pragmatics of things
that are representational vehicles, not questions about their representational status
per se’ (Callender and Cohen 2006, 75).
So according to Callender and Cohen’s view, any object A can correctly be
claimed to be a representation of a target B, in science and elsewhere, merely in
virtue of A being taken to be a representation of B. On this account, there are no
normative criteria inherent to representation that would determine that certain ways
of using the concept are correct and that others are not. This view is deflationary
in the sense that Callender and Cohen argue that stipulation exhaust all that can
be meaningfully said about representation in science, thus making representation
maximally dependent on the judgments of scientists (Callender and Cohen 2006,
75-77).
Callender and Cohen’s view is an attractive one, as it provides a unifying account
which highlights the conceptual ground shared by representation in various diﬀerent
fields. According to this notion there is nothing special about scientific represen-
tation, as it is just another instance of a general class of mental representations.
Consequently, the problems of representation, traditionally associated with defining
the concept, become reframed as problems of mental representation, and thus the
need for providing a self-standing solution to them disappears (Callender and Cohen
2006, 77-82).
However, albeit deflationary, this conception is in tension with Suárez’s formula-
tion of deflationism, since the former explicitly resists making representation depen-
dent on the norms of scientific practice. From the Suárezian point of view, Callender
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and Cohen make the meaning of representation in science an arbitrary matter, since
on their account the concept is meaningful despite the lack of normative criteria
concerning its correct use. To be sure, Callender and Cohen do not claim that the-
re would be no de facto pragmatic standards for model representation in science,
but just that these should not enter into the definition of the concept of representa-
tion. Thus, according to Callender and Cohen, it could in principle be possible that
there are models in science which serve as representations, although no pragmatic
constraints exists to determine how they should relate to their targets. Most impor-
tantly, in disagreement with Suárez, Callender and Cohen hold that it is not requi-
red for representation in science that models facilitate the generation of inferences
(Callender and Cohen 2006, 78).
Reconsidering Suárezian deflationism, then, why should the norms of practice
be included into the analysis of representation in science? A hint at the answer
to this question can be found in Suárez’s (2004, 772-773) contention that in order
to be adequate, and account of scientific representation should recognise that the
representations employed in science are objective in the sense that they allow for
inferences about their targets which could not have been drawn using just any
arbitrary symbol. That is, according to this requirement, representations in science
cannot be merely stipulative.
In discussing the inferential conception in Section 6.1.2, I argued that Suárez’s
requirement of objectivity should not be understood as a demarcation criterion
between scientific and other kinds of representation, as other kinds of representa-
tions as well can be objective in this sense. Rather, I now propose, this requirement
should be viewed as specifying the kinds of representations that are interesting from
the viewpoint of theorising about representation in science. That is, my proposal
is that, in suggesting that pragmatic features should be included into the analy-
sis of the concept of representation in science, Suárez is articulating a role that a
deflationary theory of representation could play in the study of scientific models
qua representations. The role in question is to serve as a conceptualisation of the
pragmatic features which are relevant for the understanding of various aspects of
scientific modelling.
Let us now examine this idea more closely. In the next section, I will present
the various roles that Suárezian deflationism, substantivism, and Callender and Co-
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hen’s view hold that theories of scientific representation can serve, and argue that
according to Suárez’s account, philosophical theorising can still have a part to play
in conceptualising modelling.
7.2 The roles of deflationary theories of representation
To begin, let us set against each other the diﬀerent roles that the various perspec-
tives we have examined in this thesis take theories of representation to be playing
in philosophy of modelling. To distinguish them from each other, I will call the-
se perspectives below weak substantivism, strong substantivism, stipulationism, and
Suárezian deflationism.
What I will here call weak substantivism is the of Contessa (2007; 2011), accor-
ding to which theories of representation should provide an explanatory definition of
representation, which solves the problems of constitution and style of representation
and moreover explicates how the validity of surrogative reasoning with models is
grounded. These kind of theories thus give us a general definition of representation
which is applicable across all scientific contexts, providing a unifying conceptuali-
sation of all the diverse kinds of models employed in science. Moreover, the defini-
tion can be used to evaluate whether some case of modelling qualifies as cognitive
or epistemic representation in the sense that it licenses the drawing of surrogative
inferences regarding the represented target.
By contrast, strong substantivism is a position which seeks to achieve the goals
of weak substantivism, but additionally seeks to provide a solution to the problem
of soundness of surrogative reasoning. That is, not only do strong substantivist
theories of representation aim to explain how surrogative reasoning with models can
be valid, they also provide a factual condition which is necessary and suﬃcient for
the conclusions of the surrogative inferences to be true about the represented target.
The weighted feature matching account of Weisberg (2013; 2012) discussed above is
an example of a strong substantivist theory of representation.
Now, as we have seen, deflationary theories typically eschew these aims of subs-
tantivism about representation. However, what I wish to argue for here is that not
all of them accomplish this in the same way, and that the way in which they do
so has implications concerning the uses to which those theories can be put in the
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philosophy of modelling.
First, let us consider the Callender and Cohen (2006) type of an account of repre-
sentation, which I have here called stipulationist. According to this view, the only
thing that philosophical theorising can meaningfully say about scientific representa-
tion is that a model represents some target if the user of the model takes it to be a
representation of that target. This view dissolves the problems of constitution and
style by stating that whatever is taken to be a representation is a representation,
and thus that philosophical theorising cannot uncover any more fundamental consti-
tuents for the concept. Thus, stipulationism holds that the semantic questions often
presented as problems of representation have in fact been misconceived (Callender
and Cohen 2006, 77-79).
However, the question that interests us here is how this kind of an account ap-
proaches the epistemic questions pertaining to modelling. First, let me note that the
stipulationist approach is compatible with Kuorikoski and Ylikoski’s (2015, 3828)
suggestion that the way in which the various kinds of model objects used in science
can ground surrogative reasoning is a subject of study proper to cognitive science,
and not philosophical theories of representation. Indeed, if we take scientific repre-
sentation to be a matter of mere stipulation, then there is little that our conception
can say concerning the inferential connections between models and their targets.
Since stipulation allows for the representation of a target using any source what-
soever, this conception of representation provides no insight into the evaluation of
those sources as vehicles of surrogative reasoning. However, as Kuorikoski and Yli-
koski (2015, 3828) argue, this does not mean that the validity and soundness of
surrogative reasoning could not be studied, but just that theories of representation
do not have a role to play in such studies.
More specifically relevant to the comparison with Suárezian deflationism, Cal-
lender and Cohen (2006, 78-79, 82) also argue that the role that pragmatic features
play in scientific modelling is a subject of study proper to the anthropology or socio-
logy of science, and not philosophy of scientific representation. This view seems to
stand in contrast with the Suárezian position. As we saw in the discussion of the
inferential conception, it is precisely the pragmatic features of scientific modelling
which give the rules of validity for surrogative reasoning with models (Suárez 2015,
45-46). Furthermore, according to Suárez, the meaning of the concept of represen-
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tation within each area of science is exhausted by the ’norms that govern represen-
tational practice in that area’ (Suárez 2015, 38). Thus, it seems that on a Suárezian
account, the scope of philosophical theorising about representation can be broader
than that given by the stipulationist approach of Callender and Cohen. If represen-
tation in any area of science is equivalent with some normative practice in that area,
as Suárez claims, then analyses of representation seem to have a direct bearing on
the practice in question. Moreover, if practice determines the validity of surrogative
reasoning, then it seems that theorising about representation can have an import on
our understanding of the epistemic questions concerning modelling, after all.
Let us now examine this contrast more closely. I argue that there are two distinct
roles that a deflationary theory of representation can be claimed to have in philosop-
hy of modelling, and that stipulationism and Suárezian deflationism disagree about
which one is correct.
First, the role that stipulationists attribute for deflationary theorising about
representation is that of giving room for other approaches in studies of modelling.
That is, the import of deflationism is to show that the problems which theories of
representation have traditionally been concerned with cannot be solved by means of
philosophical analysis, thus freeing other approaches from the burden of having to
take into account questions concerning the correct constituents of the representatio-
nal relation between models and the world. The upshot of this is that deflationism
leads to a situation in which philosophical theorising about scientific representation
becomes obsolete:
...there will remain a role for considerations about isomorphism, similarity, and inference ge-
neration after all. Namely, these considerations (and possibly others) may contribute to an
anthropology of the use of scientific representations by providing a taxonomy of the sorts of
pragmatically guided heuristics scientists bring to bear on their choices between representa-
tional vehicles. But if so, then there is no longer any reason to think that there is a conflict
between, say, Giere’s similarity and Suárez’s inference generation, and so no reason that
there should be a dispute between proponents of such accounts: these are simply indepen-
dent pragmatic constraints that may work together or separately to guide choices between
scientific representations. This point, we think, should serve to undercut that growing pro-
portion of the literature on scientific representation devoted to arguing in favor of one of
these accounts and against the others; if, as we contend, these accounts are not in compe-
tition, this should spare the needless consumption of much ink and many trees. (Callender
and Cohen 2006, 78-79.)
Thus, according to stipulationism, the study of representation in science should
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end when we realise that scientific representation is just another form of mental
representation, and consequently studies of scientific modelling should be freed to
be pursued as the subject of the sociology of science and possibly some other areas
in philosophy of science (Callender and Cohen 2006, 82-83).56
By contrast, Suárez (2015, 37; 2004, 767-769) explicitly holds that his deflationa-
ry approach contradicts the substantivist positions of various philosophers advoca-
ting isomorphism or similarity based accounts of representation. Moreover, the very
reason why the accounts basing on isomorphism or similarity are substantivist is
that their analyses of representation are in terms of these factual conditions. Thus,
it seems that Suárezian deflationism cannot hold that similarity, isomorphism, and
inference generation are all just ’independent pragmatic constraints that may work
together to guide choices between scientific representations’, as Callender and Co-
hen propose. Rather, Suárez seems to hold that similarity, isomorphism, and other
factual relations obtaining between models and targets are the means on which the
inferences of modellers are grounded (cf. Suárez 2003, 229-230; 2010, 93-94). On this
view, it is the practice of surrogative reasoning, or the drawing of inferences about
a target using a source, which provides the pragmatics according to which certain
factual model-world relations are judged to be relevant for representation in each
case.
Therefore, I propose that the role that Suárez sees deflationary theorising of
representation to have in philosophy of modelling is to provide a conceptualisation
of the pragmatics which determines the choice of diﬀerent representational means
employed in various areas of science. According to the inferential conception, the ru-
les determining how models can be used to draw specific inferences are the relevant
features to be examined in order to reach this goal. However, other aspects of mo-
delling, such as the construction of model systems, could in principle be viewed as
viable candidates as well. Be that as it may, the point here is that Suárez does not
56Anjan Chakravartty (2010) is another philosopher who has argued that the apparent conflict
between the diﬀerent accounts of scientific representation proposed in the literature is in fact
illusory. However, in the end, Chakravartty (2010, 203) ends up defending a view according to
which some kind of a similarity relation constrained by pragmatics is a necessary condition of
representation.
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seem to think that a deflationary analysis of representation implies that philosophy
is entirely ready to hand over the study of modelling to the sociology of science.
Now, to bring this section to an end, two questions still require addressing. First,
what can be gained by favouring a Suárezian deflationist over the stipulationist
approach? Second, what are the reasons for which we should opt for deflationism
rather than a substantivist account of representation?
Regarding the first question, one possible advantage of Suárez’s deflationism over
the stipulationist view is that it reserves a broader scope for philosophical theori-
sing. For instance, in addition to providing a (deflationary) characterisation of the
representational force of model sources, the inferential conception oﬀers an account
of the objectivity of scientific representations in terms of the specificity of the infe-
rences they allow for (Suárez 2004, 772-773). Moreover, Suárez’s (2015, 45-46) later
developments of the account connect the inferences allowed by representations to
the norms of scientific practice which determine what can be validly inferred using a
particular model source. Thus, the inferential conception provides a conceptualisa-
tion of the objectivity of cognitive representations in terms of the norms of scientific
practice which determine the validity of surrogative inferences in modelling. Such
a conceptualisation can then be used to coordinate possible studies of the norms
operative in various areas of science. What kind of norms are there at play which
determine the inferences one can validly draw on the basis of agent-based models
in sociology as compared to economics, for instance? Provided that we can give an
answer to this question, the inferential conception tells us that we have simulta-
neously given at least part of an answer to the question of what counts as objective
model representation within the respective fields.
Being a deflationary theory, however, the inferential conception does not set pre-
defined criteria on what the model-world relations or uses of models have to be like
in the fields studied. All the conception necessitates is that there is some means on
which the valid surrogative inferences determined by norms of the practice in ques-
tion can operate. Thus, over substantivist theories, deflationism has the advantage
of leaving more leeway for studies of modelling in terms of their conceptualisations
of modelling. This means that deflationism does not necessitate that the taxonomy
of the representational means used in various diﬀerent fields be unified with an ove-
rarching concept such as similarity or isomorphism. This is an advantage insofar as
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cases of modelling turn up to which such substantive relations are not applicable.
As of currently, with respect to any particular case of modelling, this is always a de-
batable issue. But once the debate is taken up, we have already recognised Suárez’s
(2010, 91-93) point that there is a need for an inquiry into scientific modelling which
emphasises the diversity of the practice of using models in scientific theorising.
8 Conclusion
The questions I set for myself in the beginning of this thesis were the following:
what are the uses that a deflationary theory of representation could be put to in
philosophy of modelling, and what are the reasons for which we might favour a
deflationist approach instead of a substantivist analysis of representation?
To answer these questions, I examined Mauricio Suárez’s conception of deflatio-
nism about representation and compared Suárez’s allegedly deflationary inferential
conception of representation with Michael Weisberg’s substantivist weighted feature
matching account. I argued that both accounts have their problems: whereas the
trouble for Weisberg’s account is rooted in its requirement that representation is
always constituted by similarity relations, for Suárezian deflationism the problems
concern his characterisation of representation as a normative practice of science.
Further on, I proceeded to examine the diﬀerent roles that deflationary and subs-
tantivist approaches reserve for theories of representation in studies of scientific
modelling.
On the basis of the above investigation I ended up with the following conclusion.
Deflationary theories of representation, as conceived by Suárez, can function as
conceptualisations of the norms at play in various areas of the practice of scienti-
fic modelling. Thus understood, deflationary representation achieves a more secure
status as a general theory of representation in science than its various substantivist
alternatives, in that it neither requires that representation should involve a particu-
lar kind of relationship between models and their targets, nor a particular way of
using or constructing model objects.
However, Suárezian deflationism has more to say about the representations emplo-
yed in science than an account which equates representation with arbitrary stipu-
lation, and herein lies its potential import for philosophy of modelling. Whereas a
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stipulationist view would have it that theories of representation stand aside and
let other approaches proceed in their studies of modelling, Suárez holds that philo-
sophical theorising can provide a general framework for conceptualising the norms
governing the representational practice of science.
It would then seem that the future development of Suárezian deflationism requi-
res that the notion of representation as a normative practice be further clarified.
What are the diﬀerent ways in which a deflationary theory of representation can
conceptualise model-building practice, and how detailed can its conception be, wit-
hout the theory becoming substantive? How can the norms relevant to representa-
tion be identified in studies of modelling, and how are such norms embodied? Should
they be conceived of as aggregates of the ways in which scientists conceive of repre-
sentation, or are there some other relevant structures of scientific practice which
would help investigate the relevant norms? Answering these questions would help
further define the deflationary approach to representation, as well as to articulate
the role that theories of representation can play in philosophy of modelling.57
57I am grateful to Professor Aki Lehtinen for supervising this thesis and for all the constructive
comments he provided at diﬀerent stages of my work. In addition, I would like to thank everyone
at the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences for their
help with the early versions of this thesis.
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